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China's growing power and attitude toward its coercive use has 
profound implications for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. One 
critical component to that stability is China's crisis behavior in key 
territorial disputes throughout the region. This paper seeks to understand 
the nature of China's nuclear deterrent threats in the post-Cold War era 
by identifying the conditions under which Chinese leaders choose 
nuclear coercion over other viable policy alternatives. Second, the 
paper explores the utility of applying prospect theory to China's crisis 
behavior to identify those conditions within a new prospect theory model. 
The findings suggest that, first, the decision to engage in nuclear 
coercion is influenced, in large part, by considerations about the status 
of one’s own territorial sovereignty and integrity. Second, the findings 
challenge realist predictions about China’s military trajectory by 
suggesting that, as China’s power grows, Beijing will be placed in fewer 
disadvantageous positions, thereby limiting the need to adopt coercive 
policies like nuclear threats. Finally, these findings suggest that prospect 
theory has significant explanatory and predictive power, both in 
international relations as well as China’s crisis management behavior.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
“At 15:00 on October 16, 1964, China detonated an atomic bomb and 
successfully carried out its first nuclear test. This is a major achievement 
made by the Chinese people in the struggle to strengthen national defense 
forces and oppose US imperialist nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats. 
Protecting oneself is an inalienable right of any sovereign state.” –  
People’s Republic of China, Official Statement, October 16, 19641 
 
1. Study Background 
 
Beijing’s desire to resist nuclear blackmail is widely regarded as one of the 
catalysts for China’s detonation of an atomic bomb on October 16, 1964. The 
epigraph suggests, then, that China’s pursuit of the bomb was “just,” in the 
sense that it exercised the inalienable rights of self-defense afforded to all 
sovereign states. This sentiment sets an appropriate tone for the rest of this 
paper: First, China has—in many ways—come full circle since 1964 in terms 
of its nuclear thought, and second, issues of sovereignty are more important to 
Chinese leaders than ever before. China’s evolving security environment—
characterized by a return of great power competition—as well as its growing 
military, economic, and political power have also heightened the significance 
of the country’s territorial sovereignty and nuclear deterrence strategy, 
bringing these issues to the fore of the country’s national security strategy. 
 
1 “Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhengfu shengming” (The Statement of the Government of 




Consequently, the last two decades of rapid change have given the 
country an opportunity to revisit the utility of nuclear weapons, if not for 
military use then potentially for implicit coercion. Has China’s position on 
nuclear coercion evolved? Beijing’s nuclear military activities, much like US 
or Russian nuclear activities, carry with them important messages that have 
intended (and unintended) meanings for domestic and international audiences. 
What kind of nuclear signals does China send to neighbors? To rivals? Do 
these nuclear signals carry different meanings in times of crisis? While a 
handful of scholars have answered the “when” and “how” China has engaged 
in nuclear coercion, little attention has been given to a potentially more 
impactful question: under what conditions does China engage in nuclear 
coercion? While the former is explanatory in nature, the latter is predictive, 
and potentially more useful for both scholars and practioners. The answer to 
this research question could have profound implications for China’s military 
trajectory, the security of its neighbors, and the future of stability in East Asia. 
 
2. Research Purpose and Objectives 
 
While research on China’s nuclear signaling is limited, scholarship on China’s 
crisis behavior is vast and thorough. Indeed, research on China’s crisis 
behavior during both the cold war and post-cold war periods is well 
documented, and scholars have applied novel theories and produced important 
 
 3 
insights. In particular, scholars have been transfixed on China’s use of 
diplomatic and military coercion. As a powerful state with ambitious national 
goals, many believe China’s use of that power to seek favorable outcomes in 
international relations is inevitable. From China’s military coercion against 
Vietnam in the 1970’s, to a two-pronged strategy of military and economic 
coercion against Taiwan during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China is 
no stranger to coercion. But while a lack of research on the country’s nuclear 
coercion is limited, this is not because China does not engage in the cold war 
pastime. On the contrary, recent scholarship has identified a staggering 
amount of evidence that Beijing has exploited the political power of nuclear 
weapons—on numerous occasions—to influence the outcome of events.2  
 As scholarship on China’s nuclear coercion grows, one of the most 
consequential areas in this budding academic enterprise will be to explain why 
China chooses to do so. On one hand, answering the “why” question will help 
make sense of the empirical evidence and generate novel findings. On the 
other hand, this approach is prone to ad hoc and post hoc arguments that have 
less than powerful predictive capacities. Furthermore, such explanations 
contribute variables that are likely only one of many that influence China’s 
decision-making during crises, making it difficult to discern which are more 
 
2 See, for example, Zhang, Baohui. China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an 
Anarchic International Order. (London: Routledge, 2017). 
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important than others. This is not to say that those variables are not important 
at all, only that they are primarily explanatory and neither sufficiently 
predictive in nature nor systematic enough in employment. In other words, 
while answering why China engages in nuclear threats is important, it is at 
least equally important to understand why China chooses them over other 
viable options. Such an approach provides not only explanatory, but also 
predictive power, in a systematic way. How can scholars fill this gap in the 
literature and provide more predictive power to the study of China’s crisis 
behavior?  
This paper establishes its place in the literature by exploring China’s 
nuclear coercion using a model that is both predictive and systematic. By 
introducing a novel theoretical framework based on prospect theory, I 
demonstrate how one can apply different variables in a systematic way that 
not only explains China’s behavior, but also predicts how Beijing might 
behave in the future, thereby filling a gap in contemporary literature. This 
novel approach is part of an active, ongoing body of literature on China’s crisis 
management, one that seeks to understand and predict China’s behavior in 
territorial disputes. 
First and foremost, this paper seeks to answer the question, “under 
what conditions does China engage in nuclear coercion?”  To this end, I first 
analyze one of the most widely studied international disputes in China’s post-
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cold war history, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute in the East China Sea 
(ECS). By performing case study analyses of the dispute during the periods of 
2012-2013 and 2014-2018, I shed light on China’s decision-making and 
nuclear signaling behavior in times of crisis. Finally, I compare these periods 
of the ECS dispute to understand why China chose implicit nuclear deterrence 
threats during one period but not in the other. In order to effectively analyze 
China’s crisis behavior, that is, Beijing’s actions under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty where the chance of military conflict is relatively high, I define 
and operationalize important terms to develop working definitions in the 
context of the research question.  
Next, I employ a unique prospect theory (PT) model as a theoretical 
framework to both explain and predict China’s behavior in a systematic 
manner. Prospect theory is a rigorous cognitive decision-making theory based 
on extensive empirical evidence. PT is widely used by economists and 
political scientists for its ability to explain how individuals make decisions 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty, and it is becoming increasingly 
common in the study of international relations. The theory posits that 
individuals are more likely to engage in risky behavior when their situation is 
framed in terms of loss, and more cautious in their actions when framed in 
terms of gains. When applied to the behavior of states in times of crisis, 
prospect theory predicts that countries will take risks to avoid losses (or 
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recover them) rather than to obtain gains of equal or greater value. To apply 
prospect theory to China’s nuclear signaling, I employ a prospect theory model 
originally developed by political scientist and security expert, Kai He, to 
explain China’s behavior in high-severity and low-severity crises,3 replacing 
his variables with my own, and thus providing an alternative explanation for 
China’s behavior during crises.  
To develop and operationalize an appropriate set of variables to 
analyze with prospect theory, I borrow insights from the neorealist school of 
international relations (IR). As an explanatory theory, neorealism’s insights 
about the nature of state behavior and international structural forces offers a 
powerful causal mechanism to explain the connection between international 
society and state behavior in foreign policy decisions. Structural realism posits 
that relations between states are defined and shaped by the international 
system’s ordering principle, the distribution of capabilities, and most 
importantly, the inherent presence of anarchy – that is, lacking a central 
authority, states rely on self-help to pursue self-interests, like security or 
power maximization.4 In the context of territorial disputes, neorealism helps 
inform the selection of appropriate measurements with which to explain how 
 
3 He, Kai. China's Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy after the Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press. 2016). 




the the independent variable, China’s domain of actions, affects the dependent 
variable, China’s nuclear coercion. 
I apply three variables—threat perception, territorial authority, and 
crisis severity—to a new prospect theory model that follows an identical 
process outlined in political scientist Kai He’s “political-survival prospect 
theory” model. From here, I develop five hypotheses based on the model’s 
findings and perform a congruence test to examine whether the predictions 
accurately reflect China’s behavior during various periods of the dispute. If 
my model is correct, it means I have accurately and systematically identified 
key variables that contribute to explaining the conditions under which China 
engages in nuclear coercion. In sum, I evaluate existing explanations for 
China’s crisis management behavior by exploring the ECS dispute to identify 
which set of situational, structural, or environmental variables play the most 
important role in determining why China chooses certain policy options, such 
as nuclear threats, over others. In this way, the conditions under which China 
engages to nuclear coercion are revealed. 
 
3. Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is structured in the following order. First, I provide an overview of 
the research topic before thoroughly exploring and critically analyzing the 
major literature in the following section. Here, I connect relevant literature, 
discuss their strengths and weaknesses in terms of the research question, and 
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demonstrate the need for my research on the topic by identifying a gap in the 
literature, as well present my plan for filling this gap. In Chapter 2, I discuss 
in detail the paper’s research design and theoretical framework. In this chapter, 
I explain relevant concepts, define important terms, introduce my theoretical 
model, and present my case study design. In this chapter, I explain how the 
data will be analyzed, how hypotheses will be developed, and how findings 
will be derived.  In Chapter 3, I analyze two case studies, interpreting 
observations through my theoretical model to produce unique insights. Finally, 
in Chapter 4, I summarize the key findings and insights derived from the 
previous chapter, discuss their implications in detail, and then identify my 
paper’s contribution to the field in relation to the research question.  
 




While much has been written on particular types of crisis behavior, there is 
one subfield of this research topic still relatively unexplored. Within the study 
of conflict and crisis management lies China’s crisis behavior, a subject of 
much analysis.5 Within this subfield lies nuclear coercion, this paper’s primary 
subject of analysis. While a great deal of research has explored China’s 
 
5 See, for example, Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall 
and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Mark Burles and 
Abram Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal 
Writing (Santa Monica, RAND, 2000).  
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coercive use of power6 and China’s nuclear signaling,7  few scholars have 
attempted to combine the two to explore China’s use of nuclear threats. Baohui 
Zhang’s pathbreaking book on China’s implicit nuclear deterrence turned the 
field on its head by presenting the first exhaustive and persuasive account of 
China’s nuclear coercion.8 Building off of Zhang’s work, one of the most 
common academic directions in reaction to this development is to answer  the  
“how” and “why” questions regarding China’s decision to engage in this type 
of crisis behavior. As a consequence, scholars tend to ignore an equally 
important question: “under what conditions does China engage in nuclear 
deterrent threats?” I begin answering this question by drawing insights from 
the wealth of literature on China’s crisis behavior to see how academics have 
answered similar questions in the past. For example, when, why, and how has 
China engaged in risky foreign policy crisis behavior, such as nuclear threats, 
in the past? Armed with this knowledge, I can identify and apply the most 
appropriate theoretical framework in a way that overcomes previous 
limitations. 
 
6 Godwin, Paul H., and Alice L. Miller. "Chinas Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat 
and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military 
Confrontation." Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National 
Strategic Studies. China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6 (2013). Doi:10.21236/ada584671. 
7 Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, 
China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
8 Zhang, Baohui. China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic 
International Order. (London: Routledge, 2017).  
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This literature review seeks to compare and contrast the different 
theoretical approaches scholars have used to study China’s crisis behavior in 
order to 1.) reveal and fill a gap in the literature regarding the importance of 
China’s nuclear signaling in crisis situations; 2.) inform selection of an 
appropriate theoretical framework for understanding the conditions under 
which China chooses particular policies, like nuclear deterrent threats, over 
others in crisis situations; and 3.) bring attention to the advantages and 
disadvantages of applying various theories to understand the conditions under 
which China’s crisis behavior takes place. Looking at the topic through a 
multidisciplinary lens that incorporates rational actor theory, cognitive 
psychological theory, and various sociocultural theories, this review 
demonstrates how these different approaches have particular strengths and 
weaknesses in characterizing China’s crisis behavior.  
 




Some of the more mainstream explanations for China’s crisis behavior in 
territorial disputes focus on China’s unique historical experience. The 
atrocities of Japan’s imperial conquests, for example, remain etched in the 
collective consciousness of many countries throughout East and Southeast 
Asia, and in particular have greatly influenced China’s perceptions of Japan’s 
intentions in the region. Chinese scholars like Ma Yong note that, in the past, 
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Japan had “used war to reverse China’s rise,” first in 1884 and then in 1937; 
consequently, Yong argues that it is not unreasonable to expect that given the 
opportunity, Tokyo may decide to do the same again9 if it were believed to be 
in Japan’s best interests. The argument follows that Japan may be using 
territorial disputes as an excuse to justify a preventive or preemptive attack, 
warranting the escalation of a small crisis into a full-blown military conflict.10 
Tim F. Liao et al., note that China’s crisis behavior is affected not only by the 
issue of territory – if this was the case conflict should have broken out years 
earlier – but by historical experience. The authors argue that crises, especially 
ones like the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, are often “deeply rooted in 
history.”11  Furthermore, Japan’s perceived neglect or misrepresentation of 
historical issues, such as recent concerns about sanitizing history textbooks, 
denials regarding the Nanjing massacre, refusals to take legal responsibility 
for war-time atrocities like the “Comfort Women” issue, and visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians12 ultimately heightens China’s threat 
perceptions and shapes its policy decisions. 
As a result, China’s behavior toward Japan leans on the more 
aggressive side of the spectrum, and therefore has a propensity to engage in 
 
9 Zhang, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, 122.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Liao, Tim F, Wiegand, Kristia E., and Kimie Hara, The China-Japan Border Dispute: 
Islands of Contention in Multidisciplinary Perspective (London: Routledge, 2015), 32.  
12 Ibid, 32.  
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more aggressive behavior. While historical approaches provide a powerful and 
persuasive lens for understanding China’s behavior, they face a number of 
limitations. First, the above explanations can appear fatalistic and individuals 
interpret history through the lens of their own personal experiences, as 
evidenced by that fact that some Chinese leaders have chosen to prioritize 
progress over historical animosity. For example, Deng Xiaoping chose to 
shelve the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in favor of normalizing ties,13 and 
Xi Jinping recently met with Japanese President Shinzo Abe to announce a 
“new historical direction” in Sino-Japanese relations, all while in the midst of 
unprecedented assertiveness by both parties in the ECS.14 While issues of 
territorial sovereignty alone do not appear to spark crisis, historical 
animosities, too, by themselves appear to be only one piece of the puzzle.  
 
Cultural and Sociocultural Approaches 
 
Scholars like Wang Xu take a primarily cultural approach to understand 
China’s crisis behavior. Xu argues that China’s foreign policy crisis behavior 
is affected by “more sophisticated political tradition, a longer history, and a 
 
13 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie. 2013. “A Dangerous Escalation in the East China Sea.” The 
Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company. January 4, 2013. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324461604578189160657533462. 
14 Fifield, Anna. 2018. “China and Japan Pledge to Take Their Relations in 'New Historic 






prouder civilization” that shapes decision-maker’s thinking, and therefore the 
policy options they consider.15 In practice, the impact of culture and tradition 
can be seen in the three guiding principles of China’s conflict and crisis 
management philosophy since Mao Zedong, known as “on just grounds,” “to 
our advantage,” and “with restraint” (youli, youli, youjie), which emphasizes 
self-defense and restraint based on China’s traditionally Confucian-based 
values that cover political, economic, and military domains. John Fairbank 
notes that Confucian culture can also act as a constraint to China’s foreign 
policy during crises. The use of force, for example, is often seen within Beijing 
as a “last resort” because of the self-perceived defensive nature of Chinese 
culture.16 One major criticism of cultural approaches, however, is that they are 
better equipped to describe the unique characteristics of China17, not explain 
changes observed over time or predict behavior.  
Alastair Ian Johnston opens a comprehensive inquiry into China’s 
dispute behavior by arguing that this dominant view of China’s crisis behavior 
is based upon relatively unfounded claims predicated on a “pacifist” Chinese 
culture that did not historically exist. In other words, scholars tend to take at 
 
15 Wang and Xu, “Pattern of Sino-American Crises,” 141–2 in “Michael D. Swaine et al., 
eds, Managing Sino-American Crises (Washington, D.C.: Baltimore, MD: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace; Hopkins Fulfillment Service, 2006) 
16 John Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Frank Kierman and 
John Fairbank, eds. Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 
7. 
17 Xinbo Wu, Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008).  
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face value the notion that China is inherently pacifist or defensive in nature 
(i.e. only engaging in “limited aggression” as a “last resort”) as a result of 
uniquely Chinese or Confucian cultural values. 18  Building on this point, 
Andrew Scobell observes a “cult of defense” within China’s military and 
political tradition. 19  Scobell argues that such a tradition, build around 
perceptions of a defensively-natured China rooted in Chinese cultural values, 
gives Chinese leadership incentives to hide offensive military operations 
behind defensive rhetoric, ironically increasing the likelihood China might use 
force. In terms of territorial disputes, cultural approaches can explain the 
Chinese strategies of “reactive assertiveness,”20 and “gray-zone deterrence,”21 
strategies that are defensive/restrained on the surface, but which are coercive 
and escalatory in practice. Both strategies advocate avoiding using force first, 
but center around justifying the exploitation of aggression in order to escalate, 
with the intention of changing the status quo.  
Other scholars focus on sociocultural factors such as identity to explain 
China’s crisis behavior. In her review of China’s behavior during the 2012-
2013 ECS crisis, Anna Costa at the University of Hong Kong presents an 
 
18 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A 
First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly, No. 153 (Mar., 1998), 1-30, 6. 
19 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force. 
20 “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks”, International Crisis Group, 
Asia Report N°280, April 8, 2013,  https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/dangerous-
waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-rocks.pdf, 79.  
21 Green, Michael et al., “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice 
of Gray Zone Deterrence”, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report (2017), 3-4.  
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exhaustive list of contemporary explanations, demonstrating that a 
combination of ideational, historical, and identity-related factors are some of 
the most prevalent approaches.22 Some of these factors touch on the historical 
memory and identity clashes between Japan and China; differing 
interpretations of history; generational changes in leadership that saw Xi 
Jinping and Shinzo Abe assume power; China’s growing confidence as a 
consequence of its meteoric rise; as well as historic shifts in the regional 
balance of power, culminating in a clash of national identities between the US 
and China.   
Where sociocultural approaches shine is their ability to explain state 
preferences and interests in terms of national identity. For example, that states 
like Russia or China tie their national identities as world powers, and thus their 
preference for actions and outcomes, on nuclear weapons and prioritize 
military spending around achieving this goal23 speak to the importance of 
identity. In terms of territorial disputes like those in the ECS and SCS, identity 
issues are an important factor in discussions about sovereignty. The US 
government for instance has tied China’s national sovereignty and territorial 
 
22 Costa, Anna. The China-Japan Conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: Useful Rivalry. 
Routledge Security in Asia Series, no. 12. (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2018) 
ISBN 978-1-138-30873-2. 
23 Kowert, Paul A. The Peril and Promise of Constructivist Theory. Ritsumeikan 





integrity to the country’s perceived identity as a great power. 24  The 
combination of factors which constitute identities, however, are difficult to 
determine or rank, and approaches based on national identity critically 
overlook the importance of individual leaders in crisis situations, which is 
particularly true in the case of China.25  
 
Rational Actor Approaches 
 
Another major approach to China’s crisis behavior is grounded in rational 
actor theory. In their investigation into Beijing’s foreign policy behavior, 
political scientists Kai He and Huiyun Feng, explore rational choice. In 
response to China’s coercive behavior during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, 
the authors demonstrate how rationalists argue that the country’s show of force 
was designed to demonstrate resolve and enhance credibility.26 In other words, 
contrary to many analyses that characterized Beijing’s behavior as reckless, 
Chinese leaders were neither reckless nor belligerent. He points out a common 
critique of rational actor theory, however: an assumption of rationality, despite 
the fact that actors do not and cannot always act rationally. Actors cannot be 
expected to act rationally when operating under conditions of incomplete 
 
24 United States Department of Defense, 2016 Annual Report to Congress: Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 41.  
25 He, China's Crisis Behavior, 13. 
26  He, Kai and Feng, Huiyun. Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia 
Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013) 75-76.  
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information, suffer from cognitive biases, or are pressured by time constraints 
that alter cost benefit analysis calculations.27  
The problem with the rationalist argument above is the post-hoc 
nature of its analysis: by arguing that decision-makers all act rationally based 
on some defined interest (i.e. some action always intentionally serves some 
purpose) anything can be rationalized for the sake of convenience. A more 
effective explanation for behavior involves explaining why some actions are 
considered more rational than others, that is, “what makes a rational choice.”28 
As He demonstrates, rationalists consider interests fixed and therefore, similar 
behavior should be observed across multiple crises of a similar nature. 
However, interests are not fixed and vary depending on a number of factors 
including emotions, biases, and lack of information. Furthermore, due to the 
uncertain, complex, and risky nature of crises, states have incentives to 
conceal their true motives.29 As a result, we do not observe China engaging in 
nuclear deterrent threats during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Crisis, but did so 
in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in 2012.30  
 
National Interest Approaches 
 
 
27 He, China's Crisis Behavior, 11.  
28 Ibid, 12.  
29 Fearon, James, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 
(1995), 379–414. 
30 Zhang, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, 123.  
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Among the security-oriented explanations are those based on realist 
interpretations of international relations that emphasize state power and 
national interests. In a broad survey of Chinese literature of the country’s crisis 
management, Johnston argues that the driving force behind China’s crisis 
behavior is informed primarily by calculations regarding threats to China’s 
core national interests, such as national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
national unity. 31  As Johnston notes, a significant portion of the Chinese 
strategic community believe that threats to these core interests require 
“resolute methods to counter the adversary,” namely, the willingness to use 
violence, particularly in territorial crises. Johnston presents a list of answers 
to the question “what might explain China’s greater willingness to use 
violence in territorial crises?” and offers up one key condition shaping China’s 
behavior: the zero-sum nature of territorial issues.”32 Michael Green et al. 
argue that China’s coercive behavior during crisis is chiefly the product of 
national interests, specifically, core national interests such as territorial 
sovereignty.33 The authors, however, demonstrate that domestic political or 
individual leadership preferences may also drive the propensity for coercion 
during territorial crises. China scholar and security expert M. Taylor Fravel, 
 
31 Johnston, Alastair Ian “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory 
and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Winter 2016), pp 28-71, 
34, 40-41, 45.  
32 Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management”, 43.  
33 Green et al., “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia,” 1-2.  
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for example, notes that regime insecurity is closely correlated to behavior in 
territorial disputes. Furthermore, Fravel implies that as China’s power grows, 
it will be able to force compromises it was unable to in the past. 
While each of the theoretical approaches reviewed offer important 
insights into China’s behavior, they suffer from several limitations. First, each 
approach has difficulty indicating which variable(s) plays the most important 
role in shaping China’s crisis behavior. Second, these approaches are primarily 
descriptive in nature and while they are adept at identifying the unique 
characteristics of China’s crisis behavior, they lack a ‘crisis management 
mechanism’ and a systematic way of predicting why China chooses particular 
policies over others in crises.34 Finally, each is prone to ad-hoc and post-hoc 
arguments that justify variable selection without providing a systematic 
explanation for their employment and selection. Consequently, the above 
approaches lack predictive power. In order to convincingly explain the 
conditions under which China engages in particular types of crisis behavior, a 
systematic and predictive approach is necessary. 
  
4.3 Nuclear Coercion and Signaling: Identifying a Gap in the Literature 
  
China scholar and nuclear policy expert Evan S. Medeiros once wrote that 
future research should attempt to understand China’s nuclear posture by 
 
34 He, China's Crisis Behavior, 8-9. 
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observing its behavior during crisis situations.35 Similarly, the use of nuclear 
threats can be better understood by observing China’s crisis behavior. And 
while Scholars have largely answered the “how,” and “why” states engage in 
nuclear coercion, little attention has been paid to the “when” (i.e. the 
conditions that lead) states to choose nuclear threats over other viable policy 
alternatives. Filling this gap in the literature will deepen both the literature on 




According to Gartzke et al., “signaling is the purposive and strategic revealing 
of information about intent, resolve, and/or capabilities by an actor A to 
alter the decisions of another actor B to improve the chances that an outcome 
desired by A is reached when the desired outcomes of A and B are 
dissimilar.”36 By this logic, signaling is a strategic decision designed to alter 
the behavior of the receiver to the benefit of the sender. Countless examples 
of signaling exist. States can bluff to alter perceptions of their capabilities or 
resolve (known as ‘cheap talk’), reveal private information to avoid costly 
contests, craft an image of themselves as a powerful military state by 
announcing their capabilities, “parading them through the streets,” conducting 
 
35 Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” 73. 
36 Erik A. Gartzke, Shannon Carcelli, J Andres Gannon, and Jiakun Jack Zhang, “Signaling 
in Foreign Policy,” World Politics Online (Aug 2017), 3. 
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exercises, or mobilize and deploy forces – all of which are signals designed to 
“shape perception and influence current or future bargains...”37 Paul Huth and 
Bruce Russet detail other strategies for signaling deterrence.38 For example, 
diplomatically, a state can bully, accommodate, or employ a mix of the two. 
Militarily, a state can pursue a policy of strength and escalate the situation, 
behave cautiously by not responding to provocations, or match without 
exceeding an opponent’s escalation. These types of signaling during foreign 




Gartzke et al., write that “signaling is the only technique that brings the 
enormous power of nuclear weapons to bear on political competition, without 
requiring their use.” 39  In the context of nuclear weapons then, nuclear 
signaling is the strategic communication of information about intent, resolve, 
or capabilities in order to achieve a desired outcome. How and why do states 
send nuclear signals and what kind of outcomes are nuclear weapons 
employed to serve? The greatest barrier to answering “why” states engage in 
nuclear coercion is that it is difficult to determine the state’s objectives, their 
 
37  Arthur Chan, Michael J. Mazarr, Alyssa Demus, Bryan Frederick, Alireza 
Nader, Stephanie Pezard, Julia A. Thompson, Elina Treyger, and Michael J. Mazarr What 
Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements and Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression. 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 7. 
38 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), 29-45, 36-37.  
39 Gartzke et al., “Signaling in Foreign Policy,” 6. 
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true resolve, and the vast number of intervening variables at play during any 
crisis. Yet, as Sechser and Fuhrmann note in their survey of literature on 
nuclear coercion, “… most thinking about nuclear weapons have been devoted 
to a single idea: the ability… to deter aggression.”40 From here, states can 
essentially choose from among several other secondary objectives. States can 
employ nuclear signals to intimidate, blackmail, or demonstrate resolve, to 
name a few. The underlying assumption being that nuclear weapons provide 
states with coercive leverage due to their destructive power.41  Ultimately, 
states are thought to send nuclear signals, such as threats of massive retaliation, 
to compel or persuade adversaries to alter their behavior.  
But how is nuclear coercion accomplished? Nuclear signals can be 
observed in “official suggestion that nuclear weapons may be used if the 
dispute is not settled on acceptable terms,” such as public statements by 
officials, diplomatic back channels, internal leaks, military preparations or 
exercises beyond normal peacetime activity, or deliberative announcements.42 
For example, in order to credibly prepare for war in a way that signaled resolve 
to the Soviet Union just after the Second World War, the US placed its nuclear 
forces on high alert and chose to fly a squadron of B-29 bombers to 
 
40 Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 4.  
41 Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 7.  
42 Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution), 6.  
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Germany. 43  The Soviet Union engaged in extended nuclear deterrence to 
protect China from veiled nuclear threats by the US during the late 1950’s, as 
evidenced by Nikita Khrushchev’s comment that the US should not forget that 
the Soviet Union also possesses atomic weapons and has the “appropriate 
means to deliver them” and that “the aggressor will at once get a rebuff by the 
same means.”44 
 While the “how” and “why” states engage in nuclear coercion has 
largely been addressed in the foundational works of Betts and Sechser et al., 
heretofore reviewed, the “when” (i.e. the conditions) nuclear coercion can be 
expected to be employed has only been alluded to or tangentially touched upon. 
This critical gap in the literature can be filled by shedding light on the 
conditions under which nuclear coercion takes place, so that we may be able 
to better understand when nuclear threats are prioritized over other equally 
viable policy options. Betts, therefore, remarks that because the outcome of 
nuclear coercion is often difficult to determine, understanding decision-
making processes “may be more important for estimating whether nuclear 





43 Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 25-26.  
44 Ibid, 31.  
45 Ibid, 18.  
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4.4 Prospect Theory: Overcoming Limitations and Filling the Literature 
Gap 
  
Based on a literature review of nuclear coercion and China’s crisis behavior, 
critical gaps in the literature were identified. First, literature on nuclear 
coercion lacks dedicated research on the conditions under which states choose 
nuclear threats over other viable policy options. Second, review of literature 
on China’s crisis behavior revealed a need for alternative explanations to 
China’s foreign policy crisis behavior. Therefore, a systematic and predicative 
approach is critically needed to investigate these literature gaps. To this end, I 
have identified prospect theory as an effective and empirically tested tool to 
systematically analyze and predict patterns in behavior under conditions of 
risk, elements characteristic of nuclear coercion.  
Prospect Theory (PT)46 is a descriptive, predictive, and empirically 
tested model of human behavior, one that holds powerful predictive and 
explanatory power. PT posits that people are more likely to engage in risk-
acceptant behavior when their situation is framed in a domain of losses and 
more risk-averse when located in domain of gains. Originally developed by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky based on lab experiments, prospect 
theory is based upon a cognitive psychological understanding regarding how 
 
46 For a comprehensive guide on prospect theory and its application to international politics, 
see McDermott, Rose. 2001. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in 
American Foreign Policy. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
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individuals make decisions. 47  Applied more prominently to the field of 
economics, it has transformed from a useful behavioral economic theory that 
explains how individuals make decisions with money into a powerful political 
theory to explain how individuals and states make foreign policy decisions. 
As Jack Levy, another prospect theory pioneer of the political science field 
states, PT is “the leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of choice 
under conditions of risk.”48  
PT is a useful tool “for understanding political decisions made under 
circumstances of high uncertainty, uniqueness, and complexity,” especially 
through empirical case study work which can readily test results. 49  PT is 
powerful because if, when tested, the model accurately predicts political 
decision making, “it then becomes possible to predict risk propensity in certain 
situations.”50 The implications for international relations and political science 
are clear – PT assists in identifying and explaining causal mechanisms behind 
foreign policy decisions made my states. According to McDermott, PT helps 
explain issues like diplomatic bargaining between states, conflict negotiation 
and resolution, as well as crisis management, which are typically risky 
 
47 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979), 263–91. 
48 Jack Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory 
for International Conflict,” International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (1996), 179–95,  
28 
49 McDermott, Risk Taking in International Politics, 8.  
50 Ibid, 9.  
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situations where political decision making is most evident.51 Prospect theory, 
therefore, provides both “explanatory and predictive insight into complex, 
uncertain decision making under conditions of risk.”52  
In sum, when people believe they are situated in a domain of losses, 
they engage in risk-acceptant behavior in a bid to either reverse or mitigate 
greater losses, even if the probability of losses outweighs the probability of 
gains. Conversely, when people perceive themselves to be located in a domain 
of gains, they engage in risk-averse (cautious) behavior, protecting their gains 
and avoiding unnecessary losses. Thus, people do not always seek to 
maximize utilities (fulfillment of an individual’s preferences) as expected 
utility theory predicts. Instead, individuals weigh their choices in a rather 
counterintuitive way: people value what they already possess and, empirically 
speaking, take risks to avoid those losses as opposed to taking risks to acquire 
gains. 
PT possesses several advantages. First, PT offers an alternative 
explanation for risk-oriented behavior, filling a gap that expected utility 
theoretical calculations have never been able to. As mentioned above, 
individuals violate expected utility predictions and engage in seemingly 
irrational “risky” behavior. PT provides logic based on extensive empirical 
 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
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testing to explain this anomaly. Second, PT does not require knowledge of a 
state’s preferences beforehand because it is a cognitive behavioral theory that 
relies on observations about human decision-making in general. As a result, 
prospect theory offers structured explanatory and predictive power: it 
systematically demonstrates when and why individuals take risks, all without 
knowledge of actor preferences. PT accomplishes this by determining the 
domain of actions predicted by the theory. Third, prospect theory is excellent 
for analyzing behavior under conditions of high uncertainty and complexity, 
making it well suited for understanding decision-making in a situation that 
involves risk. 
Prospect theory possesses a few notable weaknesses. The primary 
criticism of PT in the study of international relations is that the process of 
applying cognitive psychological theories identified at the individual-level to 
the state-level of analysis is subjective. However, as Taliaferro notes, growing 
literature on the topic has demonstrated the accuracy and appropriateness of 
prospect theory in organizational and group decision-making models. 53 
Second, critics will likely argue that PT is only a “snapshot” of decision 
making “rather than the back-and-forth negotiations between parties.54 To be 
sure, PT does not account for every situation and variable. However, the 
 
53 Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2004. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 231.  
54 Kai and Feng, Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific, p 24.  
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limitation of its scope does not detract from the importance of its insights: PT 
is a theory of choice under conditions of risk and therefore seeks to explain 




CHAPTER II: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
“We are strongly committed to 
safeguarding the country's 
sovereignty and security and 
defending our territorial integrity.” 
- President Xi Jinping 
“Provocations against Japan’s 
sovereign sea and land are 
continuing, but they must not be 
tolerated.” 
- President Shinzo Abe 
 
1. Major Concepts: Establishing Working Definitions 
 
1.1 Territorial Sovereignty & Integrity 
 
According to international law, Sovereignty refers to the “status of a state that 
is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, 
legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to foreign law other 
than public international law.”55 Thus, sovereignty means that supreme power, 
authority, and jurisdiction is vested in the state. Territorial sovereignty, 
therefore, refers to the geographic area within which a state exercises 
exclusive authority.56 In other words, the concept refers to a state’s inalienable 
and exclusive right to exercise power within the space it claims as its own 
territorial land, waters, and airspace, not subject to outside forces. 57 
Importantly, territorial sovereignty differs from jurisdiction: where the former 
denotes ownership and thus possession of a specific territory more broadly, 
the latter denotes a state’s ability to exercise authority over “people’s, 
 
55 H Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’, in Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law, Encyclopedia for Public International Law, vol 10 (North Holland, 1987) 
414. 
56 J.L. Brierly, Law of Nations, 4th ed., Oxford (1949), 142.  
57 M. N. Shaw, International Law, pp. 1-2, 5th ed., Cambridge (2003), 1-2, 424.  
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properties, and events within a territory.”58 “Occupation” is the most common 
form of territorial sovereignty and the subject of this analysis.  
Occupation of a territory to prove ownership under international law 
requires effective control over the territory. Possession by occupation involves 
two key components: “intention or will to act as a sovereign” and “the 
adequate exercise of sovereignty.” Intentions can be deduced from official 
statements and the exercise of sovereignty can be observed in “explicit or 
symbolic” acts by “legislative or administrative measures affecting the 
claimed territory… by treaties with other States recognizing the sovereignty 
of the claimant State… or demarcating boundaries.” 59  Some examples of 
exercising sovereignty include governing the islands pursuant to national law, 
repelling illegal incursions, and arresting intruders, all of which maintain the 
integrity of the territory. Administrative control in often defined as the 
“absolute administrative control over state territory and the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over its land, people, resources, and other interests without 





58 Abdulrahim, Walid, Introduction to Public International Law, Chapter 6, State Territory 
and Territorial Sovereignty. https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-
in-english/6-state-territory-and-territorial-sovereignty 
59 Ibid. 
60 Dallen J. Timothy, Jaume Guia & Nicolas Berthet (2014) Tourism as a catalyst for changing 
boundaries and territorial sovereignty at an international border. Current Issues in Tourism, 
17:1, 21-27, DOI: 10.1080/13683500.2012.71209, 21-22.  
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1.2 Balance of Threat 
 
The level of threat a state perceives naturally influences its behavior. Stephen 
M. Walt famously explored this proposition in The Origins of Alliances, 
concluding that the level of threat a state perceives is determined by a 
combination of several factors: aggregate power, proximity, offensive 
capability, and aggressive intentions. 61  Unlike Hans Morgenthau 62  and 
Kenneth Waltz’s63 classic Balance of Power theory, Walt’s Balance of Threat 
finds that events and behaviors are the consequence of more than the 
distribution of aggregate capabilities, they are the result of several interrelated 




Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann write that, “[a]t its core… coercion 
is about behavior modification. A coercer aims to persuade a victim to alter its 
behavior by taking actions that serve the coercer’s interests.”64 Alexander L. 
George eloquently refers to diplomatic coercion as “forceful persuasion,” 
employing both military action and threats of it in concert with diplomacy to 
persuade a state to alter its behavior. In the classic works of scholars like 
 
61 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p 
22-25.  
62  Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 
NY: Random House, 1948).  
63 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley, 1979) 
64 Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 22-23.  
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Thomas C. Schelling and Glenn H. Snyder, coercion is a concept from which 
two strategies are derived: deterrence and compellence.65 This paper uses the 
definition of coercion as it was employed in classic works like Schelling’s 
Arms and Influence, challenging an emerging contemporary definition that 
separates deterrence from coercion. Consistent with Schelling’s definition, I 
also define coercion broadly: coercion is any attempt to persuade a party to 
alter its behavior by taking actions that serve the coercer’s interests to the 
detriment of the receiver.66 
 
Deterrence vs. Compellence 
 
The two forms of coercion observed in international relations are deterrence 
and compellence. Compellence refers to a state’s ability to force another to 
undertake some action by threatening punishment. 67  In other words, a 
compellent threat is a threat aimed not at preventing action but prompting it. 
In contrast, deterrence refers to the ability of a state to discourage another from 
performing a specific action by threatening punishment. In other words, 
deterrence is “dissuasion by means of threat”68 in such a way that the receiver 
believes “the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks” 
 
65 See Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1966).  
66 Schelling, Arms and influence, 71.  
67 Ibid. 
68  Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 29-45, 30.  
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of the action to be deterred.69 Both concepts can also be thought of in terms of 
the status quo. While compellence is a threat that attempts to alter the status 
quo, deterrence is an attempt to prevent another state from upsetting it.70 
Additionally, compellence is considered more difficult to achieve than 
deterrence,71 although both seek to alter an opponent’s behavior in a way they 
would not have chosen to do absent the threat.  
 Importantly, both concepts are heavily dependent upon the perceptions 
of the party to be deterred as well as the credibility of the threats. As Schelling 
notes, one must understand what an adversary wants and what scares him to 
effectively alter their behavior via threat. 72  According to Robert Jervis, 
effective deterrence requires “both understanding the other side’s view of the 
state and predicting its view of the state’s policy. Unfortunately, often each 
side will have a different view, with the result that the actual impact of the 
policy greatly differs from the expected one.”73 Coercion, therefore, can be 
affected by factors such as the level of the adversary’s motivations, the nature 
 
69  John J. Mearsheimer. Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 14. 
70 Stephen L. Quackenbush. General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect 
Deterrence Theory, International Interactions 36:1, 2010, 60-85, DOI: 
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71 Schelling, Arms and influence, 98.  
72 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 3.  
73 Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, 
and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
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of its intentions, or the personality of leaders.74 The focus of this paper is on 
deterrence. Specifically, the paper investigates the conditions under which 
nuclear deterrence threats occur. As a form of coercion, this paper will refer 
to nuclear threats and nuclear coercion synonymously. 
 
1.4 Foreign Policy Crisis 
 
To shed light on China’s nuclear coercion, I examine the country’s crisis 
behavior over several crises. What types of crisis exist and how are they 
categorized? I employ the same crisis typology and corresponding risk 
properties as outlined in Kai He’s paper, “China’s Crisis Behavior: Political 
Survival and Foreign Policy after the Cold War.”75 Crises are divided into two 
categories, “near crises” and “militarized interstate disputes” (MIDs). A near 
crisis describes a diplomatic conflict that possess a low possibility of military 
conflict.76 Such crises are characterized by tensions and distrust that can spiral 
or escalate quickly, crossing the threshold into military conflict unexpectedly. 
More drastically, MIDs refer to the “threat, display or use of military force 
short of war by one-member state… explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of 
 
74  Arthur Chan et al., What Deters and (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 11-
14 
75 He, China's Crisis Behavior,18.  
76 Michael Swaine, “Understanding the Historical Record,” in “Michael D. Swaine et al., eds, 
Managing Sino-American Crises (Washington, D.C.: Baltimore, MD: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace; Hopkins Fulfillment Service, 2006), 2–3. 
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another state.” 77  The difference between near crises and MIDs is the 
probability of armed conflict.  
In this paper, I define “crisis” as a combination of both near crises and 
MID events because the probability of military conflict has fluctuated 
throughout China’s territorial disputes. This definition most accurately reflects 
the dynamic and rapidly nature of the China’s crisis and crisis-like disputes. 
As in He’s PT model, I employ the concept of “foreign policy crisis” to 
describe this comprehensive definition. A foreign policy crisis is a primarily 
diplomatic crisis that possesses a relatively high probability of military 
conflict due to inherently dangerous behavior and rhetoric associated with 
them.78 Therefore, this paper seeks to identify trends and patterns in China’s 
crisis behavior through an examination of the country’s coercive behavior, 
specifically its nuclear signals, in foreign policy crises where the stakes are 
high, response times are short, and the probability of military conflict is 
significant 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Validity of Model Assumptions & Variable Selection: Neorealism  
 
To identify an appropriate set of variables to analyze the conditions under 
which China employs nuclear signals, such as nuclear threats, I employ 
 
77 He, China’s Crisis Behavior, 6.  
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insights from the neorealist school of international relations (IR) in crafting a 
three-factor prospect theory model. Importantly, to avoid the arbitrary 
selection of variables, an overarching theory is necessary. Neorealism’s 
insight on the impact of structural factors offers a powerful causal mechanism 
that explains the connection between international society and state behavior 
in foreign policy decision-making. At its core, neorealism posits that relations 
between states are defined and shaped by the international system’s ordering 
principle, the distribution of capabilities, and most importantly, the inherent 
presence of anarchy—that is, lacking a central authority, states rely on self-
help to pursue self-interests.79  I use these insights to inform my selection of 
two independent variables for a prospect theory model designed to explain and 
predict China’s crisis behavior.  
 First, neorealists view the state as an independent, unitary, and rational 
actor primarily concerned with the pursuit of self-interests like power or 
security. 80  81  Second, state interactions, absent a central authority, are 
characterized by fierce competition and a zero-sum environment.82 Third, as 
 
79 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York, NY: Norton 2014), 
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the distribution of capabilities varies from state to state, perceptions of 
insecurity fuel interstate competition. Fourth, when combined, these factors 
make states hyper-sensitive to changes in relative power – the growing power 
of a neighbor threatens one’s own security. Therefore, in an effort to maximize 
self-interests and minimize threats to those interests83 84, states possess great 
incentive to achieve self-interests through the use of force. Thus, Kenneth 
Waltz and other structural theorists argue that the international system’s 
structure makes conflict inevitable.85 Consequently, state behavior is not a 
product of human nature, but of the anarchic structure of the international 
system, which shapes state preferences and conditions their actions.86  
Applied to China’s crisis behavior in territorial disputes, I argue that 
neorealism—which uses broad, systemic observations to explain state-level 
behavior—is best suited to explain risk-acceptant foreign policies. In an 
anarchic international order where states must rely on self-help for survival, 
competition is fierce, sensitivity to relative power is great, insecurity is 
systemic, and a zero-sum game characterizes state interaction, the degree of 
uncertainty and risk in state-level interactions is high. As a result, risk-taking 
behavior in foreign policy crisis are inevitable. Therefore, I argue that 
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territorial dispute crises, which are characterized by risk and uncertainty, are 
defined by variables that speak directly to the impact of power and security. 
Subsequently, I use these neorealist insights to inform the selection of 
independent variables as well as an appropriate reference point in my prospect 
theory model.  
 
2.2 Building a Prospect Theory Model 
 
To identify the conditions under which China chooses to engage in nuclear 
coercion over other viable coercive policy options, I employ a prospect theory 
(PT) model first developed by political scientist Kai He for the purpose of 
examining China’s crisis behavior. 87  To increase the reproducibility and 
validity of my model, I adhere strictly to the processes and rules He outlines 
in his model. Like He, I endeavor to provide an alternative explanation for 
when, why, and how China chooses certain policies over others under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty. However, unlike He, I only examine 
coercive behavior (such as nuclear signals) to understand the variety of 
coercive policy decisions observed among three cases, whereas He compares 
coercive and accommodative behavior to understand a variety of crisis 
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Analyzing China’s Nuclear Signaling Behavior with Prospect Theory 
At its core, prospect theory provides “explanatory and predictive insight into 
complex, uncertain decision making under conditions of risk”88 and is thus a 
useful tool “for understanding political decisions made under circumstances 
of high uncertainty, uniqueness, and complexity,”89 such as nuclear signaling 
behavior in crisis situations. But why is PT an appropriate tool for analyzing 
China’s coercive crisis behavior? First, as demonstrated in the literature 
review, alternative explanations that possess systematic and predictive power 
are needed to better explain and predict China’s crisis behavior, in particular, 
often ignored behaviors such as nuclear signaling. Second, PT is a powerful, 
flexible, and empirically-tested theory that explains decision-making under 
conditions of risk in a systematic manner. When analyzing foreign policy 
crises, which are inherently complex, uncertain, and unique events, other 
theories have difficulty systematically identifying the conditions under which 
certain behaviors should be expected to take place, let alone when some 
behaviors are prioritized over others. PT, on the other hand, is a universal 
behavioral theory that can explain risk propensities in decision-making, 
regardless of actor preferences or interests.90 Third, PT is uniquely designed 
to explain and predict policy decisions under conditions of uncertainty and 
 
88 McDermott, Risk Taking in International Politics, 9. 
89 Ibid, 8.  
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risk, and China’s nuclear coercion satisfies this criterion exceptionally well 
due to the uncertainty and risk associated with nuclear signals, like nuclear 
threats. Finally, I am simply applying an established theory to a novel problem. 
I do not contend that other theories are wrong, only that prospect theory has 
utility in explaining the more unique aspects of China’s crisis behavior. 
PT Step 1: Employing a Crisis Behavior Typology 
 
The dependent variable under investigation in this paper is China’s coercive 
crisis behavior, specifically, its use of nuclear coercion. Based on He’s PT 
model, I utilize a “coercion” and “accommodation” typology for classifying 
different crisis behaviors. In a foreign policy crisis, states choose between two 
broad policy strategies, coercion or accommodation, which predisposes them 
to four specific foreign policy behaviors (see figure 1). A state that chooses 
coercion aims to achieve political or military goals through escalation91 and 
can employ diplomatic or military coercion to those ends. The former can 
involve severing diplomatic ties, calling ambassadors back, lodging formal 
protests, or implementing sanctions, to name a few.92 The latter can include 
mobilizing the military, performing exercises, or making implicit/explicit 
threats of violence. He notes that a strategy of accommodation seeks to de-
escalate the situation in hopes of resolving the dispute and accomplishes this 
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through either complete or conditional accommodation. Complete 
accommodation refers to fully conceding to an opponent’s demands, while 
conditional accommodation refers “partially or conditionally” conceding to 
one’s demands.93 In crises, states tend to employ a mixture of coercive and 
accommodative strategies.94  
 
Figure 1. China’s crisis behavior typology 
 









*Each cell reflects the relative risk propensity of the different foreign policy behaviors 
available to states during crisis. Cell 1 represents the least risky behavior and Cell 4, the 
riskiest. (Source: Kai He, “China’s Crisis Behavior.”) 
 
 
PT Step 2: Operationalizing Risk – Identifying Crisis Behavior Risk 
Propensities 
 
Following He’s model, I measure risk by employing political scientist Rose 
McDermott’s “magnitude” measurement, based on the economic definition of 
risk.95 In economics, risk is often analyzed in terms of the variance between 
best and worst outcomes. The riskiest decision, therefore, is one where the 
outcome of an event stretches between two extremes—a best and worst-case 
scenario—possessing the greatest variance of outcome. Because of the greater 
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variance, such an option is more prone to suffer the worst outcome and is 
therefore risky. Such behavior is considered “risk-acceptant.” Conversely, the 
least risky option is the one that neither offers the best, nor the worst outcome, 
and possesses less variance and thus less risk.96 This type of behavior is “risk-
averse.” This definition of risk allows me to classify the four foreign policy 
behaviors—full/conditional accommodation and diplomatic/military 
coercion— as either more risk-acceptant or risk-averse, revealing different 
levels of risk propensities. 
In this paper, the best outcome in a foreign policy crisis is the de-
escalation or elimination of the threat causing the crisis and, conversely, the 
worst outcome deepens the threat or escalates the crisis toward conflict.97 
Combining the four foreign policy crisis behaviors and the concept of risk, we 
can infer that the greater the variance of outcome in a foreign policy crisis, the 
greater the chance of military conflict. In other words, “we can measure the 
‘risk’ level of crisis behavior with reference to the possibility of military 
conflict or war.”98 As noted earlier, due to the higher probability of military 
conflict, coercion is riskier than accommodation. Thus, the higher the 
probability of armed conflict, the higher the risk associated with that behavior. 
For example, military coercion is the riskiest behavior, diplomatic coercion 
 
96 Ibid, 39-40.  
97 He, China’s Crisis Behavior, 34. 
98 Ibid.  
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less so, and so on (see figure 1). In sum, coercive behavior is risky because the 
escalation associated with it increases the probability of military conflict (risk-
acceptant), whereas accommodative behavior cautious in nature because it is 
associated with a low probability of military conflict (risk-averse).99 
 
PT Step 3: Setting a Reference Point 
 
A reference point is an analytical tool used in PT to define and evaluate an 
actor’s domain of gains and losses, allowing for predictions regarding when 
China is more likely to choose a more or less coercive during crises. According 
to prospect theory, people tend to evaluate their situation and weigh their 
choices based on their perceived position relative to a reference point. If an 
individual perceives themselves above the reference point, they are located in 
a domain of gains and if below it, in a domain of losses. Following He, I also 
set the reference point as the status quo. In other words, China views its 
situation and chooses its actions based on its position, whether advantageous 
or disadvantageous, relative to the status quo.  
Borrowing insights from neorealism, I contend that states are chiefly 
concerned with their nation’s physical security and sovereignty as a result of 
the structural pressures inherent in the international system. In the context of 
a territorial dispute, therefore, states prioritize the security of their claimed 
 
99 Ibid.  
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territory and the enforcement of their sovereignty claims. Thus, I define the 
status quo in terms of China’s perception of the status of its territorial 
sovereignty and integrity. In other words, the reference point is China’s 
confidence in (advantageous position), or perceived threat to (disadvantageous 
position), its territorial sovereignty and integrity (TSI). According to PT, if 
China perceives itself in an advantageous position relative to its TSI status, 
the country can be said to exist in a domain of gains and thus more likely to 
behave cautiously; if, however, China perceives itself in a disadvantageous 
position, the country is located in a domain of losses and more likely to behave 
in a risk-acceptant manner. In the context of foreign policy crises, a state in an 
advantageous position is more likely to de-escalate a crisis while states in a 
disadvantageous position are likely to escalate. To measure the reference point, 
I identify a domain of actions.  
 
PT Step 4: Establishing the Domain of Actions 
 
Domain of action refers to whether a particular action China takes operates in 
a perceived state of gains or losses relative to a reference point.100 Indeed, 
foreign policy decision-making is heavily influenced by this framing effect – 
that is, how policy options are framed in an advantageous or disadvantageous 
position affects behavior.101 To establish a domain of actions, I introduce a 3-
 
100 McDermott, Risk-Taking in International politics, 37.  
101 Ibid, 7. 
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factor prospect theory model using variables derived from neorealist 
assumptions about the manner in which states interact in territorial disputes. 
Specifically, I inform variable selection by taking into account both structural 
factors (such as the distribution of capabilities) as well as unit-level factors 
(such as threat perception) in a way that measures the reference point, a state’s 
territorial sovereignty and integrity status. I argue that the primary factors 
shaping China’s TSI status are 1.) China’s threat perception of rivals; 2.) 
territorial authority in a given dispute; and 3.) crisis severity of a given dispute. 
Each of these variables is framed in terms of whether China sees itself as being 
in an advantageous (domain of gains) or disadvantageous (domain of losses) 
position relative to the reference point, TSI status. Combined, these variables 
measure China’s TSI status, which constitute the country’s domain of actions 
in territorial disputes. This allows “the conditions under which risk-averse or 
risk-acceptant behavior” occur to “become clear and predictable,” producing 
“systematic, predictable tendencies in risk propensity.”102 
 
2.3 The 3-factor Territorial Sovereignty & Integrity (TSI) Prospect 
Theory Model 
 
When a foreign policy crisis threatens or damages the integrity of a state's 
claimed territory, challenging its sovereignty, it puts the country’s core 
national interests at stake. How does China respond in such a scenario? 
 
102 McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, 9.  
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Borrowing from the conceptual framework laid out in He’s “political survival” 
PT model, I develop a new model that conceptualizes the link between TSI 
status and risk propensity of different foreign policy crisis behaviors. 
According to my 3-factor TSI prospect theory model, the policy options China 
considers in the midst of territorial disputes depends on the country’s 
perception of the status of its territorial sovereignty and integrity. I have 
identified China’s TSI status as composed of three elements: China’s threat 
perception of rivals, its level of control over claimed territory, and the severity 
of the crisis.  
The TSI prospect theory model inserts itself into an ongoing scholarly 
debate that seeks to understand, explain, and predict China’s crisis behavior. 
This unique model also comes at a critical time by analyzing the behavior of 
the most powerful country in Asia against the backdrop of an evolving 
geopolitical environment and international order characterized by insecurity. 
By understanding the factors that shape China’s crisis behavior, this model 
can shed light on how countries can better manage territorial disputes with 
Beijing. Finally, the TSI prospect theory model tries to explain China’s crisis 
behavior from the pragmatic and scientific perspective founded on 
empirically-tested human behavior, as well as the power realities and 
structural forces at play in international relations as articulated by the 
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neorealist school of IR, as opposed to cultural, emotional, or ideational 
discussions of national pride or ancient tradition.  
 
1. Level of Crisis Severity 
 
As a measurement of China’s TSI status, crisis severity is an important 
variable because it is representative of a major subject of analysis in this paper, 
crises. Using an established measurement employed by several prospect 
theory models that analyze China’s crisis management behavior103 I measure 
a crises level of severity by the level of violence or potential violence, 
measured either as high or low. If a crisis involves direct violence or threats 
of violence, it is coded as “high” in severity. Conversely, the less violence 
used or threatened reflects a “low” crisis severity. In other words, high severity 
crises are characterized by a heighted probability for military conflict and low 
severity crises are characterized by a relatively low probability of military 
conflict. The logic here is simple: the more violence or threatened violence in 
a crisis, the more threat to China’s TSI status. Therefore, a high level of 
severity (high probability of conflict) is negatively correlated with TSI status 
and is represented by a (–) in figures 2 and 3. A low level of severity (low 
probability of conflict) is positively correlated with TSI and is represented by 
a (+) in figures 2 and 3. The probability of military conflict can be measured 
 
103 He, China's Crisis Behavior, 37. 
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by analyzing the content of official speeches, identifying verbal threats, 
violent incidents, or near-incidents, and public opinion polls. 
 
2. Threat Perception 
 
When a foreign policy crisis threatens or damages a state's core territorial 
interests, its threat perception regarding the source of the problem is high. It 
follows, then, that a state’s subsequent behavior is influenced by threat 
perception. Indeed, Stephen Walt demonstrates in his classic balance of threat 
theory that when threat perception is high, states tend to ally with or balance 
against the threat.104 How a state determines the level of threat to its values or 
interests is influenced by several factors, such as aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions.105 Based on these 
four measurements of threat perception, we can predict that the higher China’s 
threat perception, the greater the threat to China’s TSI status. A high threat 
perception reflects insecurity, and is negatively correlated with TSI status – 
that is, insecurity has a negative impact on a state’s sovereignty as well as its 
ability to maintain the integrity of its borders. We can observe the effect of 
threat perception on risk propensity and behavior by examining figure 5.1. As 
threat perception increases, a state finds itself in a domain of losses, and is thus 
more likely to engage in risky behavior. 
 
104 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 9.  
105 Ibid, 21.  
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First, aggregate power will be measured by the size of Japan’s 
economy, its population, its technological prowess, and its offensive military 
capabilities and capacities. Second, geographic proximity can be measured by 
the relative distance from Japan’s territory to China’s mainland, in comparison 
to China’s neighbors. Third, offensive capabilities will be measured by an 
adversary’s ability to amass large, mobilize military capabilities that threaten 
China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity. Finally, aggressive intentions will 
be measured by the perceptions of the Chinese public, its leaders, and its 
strategic community’s beliefs about the threat an adversary poses to China’s 
TSI; this measure of threat level will establish a connection between physical 
threats and subjective fears.106 
In the model, threat perception is coded either low or high. How this 
variable is coded depends on how many of the four measurements accurately 
reflect China’s threat perception of an adversary. For example, if only one to 
two measurements accurately reflect China’s threat perception, the variable 
will be coded “low” and represented by a (–) symbol in figures 2-3 because a 
low level of threat is positively correlated with TSI status. If three to four 
measurements accurately reflect China’s threat perception, the variable will 
be coded “high” and represented by a (+) in figures 2-3 because a high level 
 
106 He, Kai and Feng, Huiyun, "Why is there no NATO in Asia?' Revisited: Prospect theory, 
balance of threat, and US alliance strategies", European Journal of International Relations, 
2010, 18(2) 227-250, DOI:1354066110377124, 235 
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of threat is negatively correlated with TSI status – that is, high threat 
perception reflects a low degree of confidence and a high degree of insecurity 
regarding a state’s TSI. Consequently, the more the four measurements 
accurately depict threat perception, the greater confidence we can have in 
establishing a high level of threat and vice versa. 
3. Territorial Authority 
 
Territorial disputes are often seen as more salient and serious than other types 
of disagreements. Indeed, international security expert and political scientist 
Robert A. Pape, for one, notes that the “principal issue in serious international 
disputes” tends to be “control over territory”107 and Paul Huth and Fuhrmann 
et al. find that issues over territory are more likely to end in conflict and long-
term animosity than other issues, making them more dangerous.108 It follows 
that the degree to which a state can exercise authority over a territory has a 
profound impact on that state’s ability to protect its core territorial interests. 
This concept defines the next variable in my TSI prospect theory model, 
“territorial authority.”  
Territorial authority is measured by 1.) China’s maritime military 
power relative to an adversary; and 2.) the level of China’s effective control 
 
107 Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 16, 37.  
108 Huth, Paul K. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. 
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 
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over the disputed territory, coded as either strong (+) or weak (–). In short, 
strong territorial authority means that a state exercises substantial control over 
the dispute and possesses great confidence in its ability to influence the 
outcome of the dispute in favorable way. Weak territorial authority means that 
a state does not exercise much control over the territory and possesses little 
confidence in its ability to influence the outcome of events favorably. The 
stronger the territorial authority, the stronger a state’s territorial sovereignty 
and integrity and vice versa. In other words, this variable reflects China’s 
ability to secure and maintain its core territorial interests and is indicative of 
Beijing’s confidence in its level of control over the dispute.  
The relative balance of naval power between China and its adversaries 
can be measured by comparatively analyzing defense budgets, naval military 
strength in terms of the number of superior naval vessels and their armaments, 
as well as primary and secondary accounts from and officials regarding their 
country’s perception of each other’s naval capabilities. Should Japan’s naval 
and maritime military power match or exceed China’s own in the area around 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, for instance, we can infer that Beijing possesses 
a weak territorial authority. A naval disadvantage inhibits a state’s ability to 
exact control over the outcome of the dispute or deter serious challenges to its 
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territorial sovereignty. 109  Thus, weak territorial authority is negatively 
correlated with TSI status territorial and is coded as (–) in figures 2-3. 
Conversely, if China’s naval and maritime military power exceeds that of 
Japan’s in the ECS, China can be said to possess a strong territorial authority. 
Strong territorial authority is reflected by a (+) in figures 2-3 because it is 
positively correlated with a state’s TSI. China’s confidence in the ability of its 
naval and maritime forces to satisfy the security needs of core territorial 
interests is important – a shift in this variable changes China’s perception of 
its TSI status, which could have an important impact on framing the country’s 
situation in terms of gains or losses For example, if China lacks confidence in 
its ability to control the dispute, Beijing could perceives its situation in terms 
of losses and more likely to take risk-acceptant actions. Thus, China’s TSI 
status is shaped by its military’s ability to protect core national interests, 
thereby maintaining control over the dispute.  
In terms of China’s effective control over a disputed territory, this is 
often measured by a state’s “administrative control” over a territory. 
Administrative control refers to a state’s ability to maintain a constant and 
 
109 Fravel, Taylor M. Strong Borders Secure Nation: Co-operation and Conflict in China’s 
Territorial Disputes. (Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 20-21. 
Fravel’s theory bases territorial claim strength on territorial control, which I use 
synonymously with ‘authority’. Fravel notes that control is transformed into bargaining power 
and increases the possibility of a favorable outcome, whether diplomatically or militarily, as 
he defines control as “the ability to project military power over all contested areas.” Therefore, 
territorial control is not only a legal concept, but a military one based on a state’s military 
strength and power projection. 
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permanent presence in and around the territory, regulate activities within its 
jurisdiction, and enforce sovereignty by either military or law enforcement, 
pursuant to national law.110 Furthermore, control over a territory is critically 
important. M. Taylor Fravel asserts that based on empirical evidence from 
both China’s history and that of other states, “shifts in its claim strength ... 
explain decisions to use force.”111  The logic here is as follows: if a state 
possesses administrative control over a territory, it can exercise greater power 
over the territory and therefore the dispute. Subsequently, administrative 
control is positively correlated with territorial sovereignty and integrity 









110 Dallen J. Timothy, Jaume Guia & Nicolas Berthet, “Tourism as a catalyst for changing 
boundaries and territorial sovereignty at an international border, Current Issues in Tourism, 
17:1, (2014), 21-27. DOI: 10.1080/13683500.2012.71209, 21-22. 
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(Domain of Losses) 
High severity crisis (–)      Aggregate = (–)  
 
*Each Cell represents China’s domain of actions in relation to its TSI status. Measured 
from Lowest, Low, High, and Highest, each Cell represents the level of threat to the 
country’s territorial sovereignty and integrity status. For example, Cell 3 demonstrates 
that when TSI status is very low (Lowest), China finds itself in a domain of losses. 
According to prospect theory, China is more likely to engage in risk-acceptant 
behavior, defined in this paper as either diplomatic or military coercion. Conversely, 
Cell 2 depicts a situation in which China is very confident in its TSI status, perceives 















































Sovereignty &  
Integrity  
 
(Domain of Gains) 
  Low severity crisis (+)                      Aggregate = (+) 
 
The result of this model is (8) triads that together depict China’s TSI status. 
Reading the model is simple. The negative and positive signs demonstrate the 
relationship between the variable and China’s TSI status; for ease of use and 
comprehension, I have simplified the model by assigning the same value 
(weight) to the impact of all three variables. For example, in Figure 2, Cell 3 
we observe that China’s threat perception of its rival is HIGH (–), its authority 
over the disputed territory WEAK (–), and the severity of the crisis is HIGH 
(–). The aggregate effects of these three factors on China’s TSI status is 
negative, as evidenced by the three negative signs – that is, China’s TSI status 
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is very low. A low TSI status reflects that China perceives itself in a domain 
of losses. According to prospect theory, China is more likely behave in a risk-
acceptant manner.   
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
By linking the domain of actions demonstrated in the 3-factor TSI prospect 
theory model with the risk-propensity policy choices outlined in Figure 1, we 
can infer the following logic. If China perceives itself in a domain of losses—
that is, its TSI status is low or lowest—prospect theory predicts that Beijing 
will act in a risk-acceptant manner. Based on earlier analysis of the foreign 
policy crisis behavior typology in Figure 1, risk-acceptant foreign policy 
behaviors involve coercive strategies like economic and military coercion. If, 
however, China perceives itself in a domain of gains—that is, its TSI status is 
coded either high or highest—Beijing is more likely to engage in risk-averse 
behavior, employing strategies like full or conditional accommodation. 
Consequently, I develop five hypotheses from the propositions expressed in 
the model: 
 
H1. When China’s TSI status is framed in a domain of gains, Beijing 
is more likely to choose risk-averse policies in territorial disputes. 
H2. When China’s TSI status is framed in a domain of losses, Beijing 
is more likely to choose risk-acceptant policies in territorial disputes. 
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H3. The higher the TSI status in a domain of gains, China will 
behave more cautiously –choosing an accommodative policy.  
H4. The lower the TSI status in a domain of losses, China will 
behave in a riskier way – choosing a coercive policy. 
H5. When China is located in the “lowest” TSI status, Beijing will 
engage in the most extreme forms of foreign policy risk-taking 
behavior, such as employing nuclear threats. 
 
4. Case Study Design 
 
4.1 Research Objectives 
 
In short, this thesis seeks to explore China’s coercive behavior in foreign 
policy crises, specifically in territorial disputes, to understand when and why 
Beijing chooses nuclear deterrent threats over other viable policy options. This 
investigation answers the research question by determining the conditions 
under which China engages in nuclear coercion. The goal of this research 
design, therefore, is to analyze the most relevant domain-specific cases that 
reveal whether the dependent variable, China’s nuclear coercion, differs or 
coincides with prospect theory’s predictions along the independent variable, 
China’s domain of actions, by three factors: crisis severity, threat perception, 






4.2 Validity and Appropriateness of Case Study Analysis 
 
Case study analysis is the most widely used method of applying prospect 
theory to international politics,112 and case studies are the “preferred strategy” 
in these situations.113 This is because qualitative methods, such as empirical 
case study analysis, are the most appropriate tool for studying complex and 
unique phenomena, such as coercive nuclear signaling during crises, as well 
as determining factors and discerning trends. With regard to testing 
hypotheses, case studies are also the standard approach in the social sciences 
and humanities. Consistent with previous literature, I will analyze China’s 
coercive behavior over several cases. In terms of this paper’s research question, 
case study methodologies possess a few notable limitations that need to be 
addressed. Critics will likely argue the limited number of case studies is not 
generalizable. While this is true to an extent, the advantages of utilizing 
prospect theory act to mitigate these concerns. Findings are generalizable to 
an extent because 1.) the model’s predictions are based on empirically-tested 
human behavior; and 2.) the model systematically identifies the conditions 
under which certain policies are more likely to occur than others.  
Regarding the first point, the PT model used to analyze the cases is 
universal in the sense that its predictions are based on both the unit-level 
 
112 McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics, 8.  




factors, like the decision-making processes of individuals generally, as well as 
structural factors, such as neorealist assumptions about the way state 
interactions in the international system. Although a number of intervening 
variables can and do influence behavior, case study analysis using the 3-factor 
TSI PT model offers the most scientific and systematic barometer for 
understanding how decisions are made during crises, and therefore, unlike 
other variables, is the most likely factor in consideration when decisions under 
conditions of risk are made. In other words, findings will, at the least, be more 
generalize than other qualitative approaches or theories not founded upon vast 
empirical data. Additionally, the purpose of a PT case study is not to explain 
or generalize all crisis behavior, but instead to “document that domain and 
framing can have a profound and predictable… effect on the substance and 
content of decision making under conditions of risk.”114  
Second, unlike ad-hoc and post-hoc arguments, PT case studies 
identify the conditions under which certain actions take place – as long as a 
reference point and domain of actions are reasonably established, case study 
results can be applied to China’s crisis behavior in the past, present, and future, 
as well as other countries under similar conditions. Finally, critics may argue 
that qualitative case studies are not rigorous enough to derive significant value. 
To combat this perception, I have adhered strictly to the framework outlined 
 
114 McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics, 44.  
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in He’s “political survival” prospect theory model as well as the rules and 
processes laid out in McDermott’s primer on using prospect theory in 
international politics. 115  As a result, the model is systematic and highly 
reproducible.  
 
4.3 Case Selection 
 
To identify and analyze the most relevant domain-specific cases studies that 
reveal whether the dependent variable, China’s nuclear coercion, differs or 
coincides with prospect theory’s predictions along the independent variable, 
China’s domain of actions, I select cases based on three basic criteria. First, 
cases must be territorial disputes that fall under the category of “foreign policy 
crises” as defined in Chapter III. The 3-factor TSI PT theory specifically 
explores territorial disputes because China’s nuclear coercion has only been 
well documented in territorial disputes. Second, cases must be in the East 
China Sea. To minimize differences and maximize control, I sample from the 
same area. Finally, cases must have occurred in the period between 2009 and 
2018. This period is chosen because I aim to comparatively analyze the most 
similar crises that directly preceded and followed China’s nuclear deterrent 
threats in 2012-2013. There are a few reasons for this. First, cases should 
reflect China’s considerable power and the shifting regional power dynamics 
 
115 See McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics.  
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created by that, and therefore must avoid time periods where its power and 
trajectory were less assured. Second, selecting cases in this way ensures the 
greatest similarity between cases – this is particularly important when trying 
to control for variables like threat perception, which varies over time. Based 
on these criteria, I identify two cases for analysis:  
 
1. 2012-2013 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute  
2. 2014-2018 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute  
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 
To answer the research question, I locate data as guided by the 3-factor TSI 
prospect theory model and stipulated in Rose McDermott’s prospect theory 
primer, “Risk-Taking in International Politics.” For example, to collect data 
on the TSI model’s threat perception variable during the 2012-2013 ECS crisis, 
I located data on the four measurements of threat perception: aggregate power, 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions. For aggregate 
power, I collected data on Japan’s economy, population, tech industry, and 
military capabilities. I employ a wide variety of data from both primary and 
secondary sources including government documents, official statements, think 
tank reports, military white papers, media commentary, editorials, and 
scholarly articles. In regard to China’s nuclear signaling, much of the data has 
already been collected by China expert Baohui Zhang, and I sample heavily 
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from Zhang’s work for the hard data. The data is then clustered according the 
typologies laid out the in the TSI PT model. Finally, collected data will be 
interpreted according to the 3-factor TSI prospect theory model’s predictions.  
 
4.5 Hypothesis Testing: Congruence Test 
  
I test my five hypotheses by performing a congruence test. A congruence test 
seeks to establish whether the empirical facts agree or coincide with the 
hypotheses derived from my model. I test the hypotheses by analyzing China's 
coercive crisis behavior, paying special attention to its nuclear signaling 
behavior, over two separate cases from 2012 to 2018. The test will proceed in 
three steps. First, I will introduce the crisis and identify China’s available 
policy options, framing them in terms of whether they are risk-averse or risk-
acceptant. Second, I refer to the status of China’s territorial sovereignty and 
integrity, according to the 3-factor TSI model, during each case. Here, I 
identify the domain of actions, whether a domain of gains or losses, China is 
positioned in during each crisis. Finally, I compare whether the hypotheses 
accurately reflect China’s policy behavior, that is, whether the facts are 
congruent with the predictions. If they are congruent, the model is accurate for 
that case study. However, if the results are not congruent, the model is not 




CHAPTER III: CASE STUDY 
 
“外事无小事” 
“There is no small issue in foreign affairs.” 
- Zhou Enlai, China’s first premier and foreign minister 
 
1. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 2012-2013   









1.1 Crisis Background 
 
The East China Sea crisis over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands lasted a 
grueling 14 months, from September 2012 to December 2013, bringing China 
and Japan to the brink of war. The dispute, over sovereignty and possession of 
eight (mostly barren) islands in the ECS, has a painful past, further 
complicated by deep historical animosities, fiery nationalist sentiment, and 
rich resources underneath the seafloor bed around the islands. Indeed, the 
dispute dates back over 100 years and has yet to find resolution – and prospects 
for resolution still look dim as of this writing. Japan first annexed the islands 
in 1895, and later fell under U.S. control following Japan’s defeat in World 
War II. In 1972, around the time China and Japan normalized relations, the 
U.S. reverted possession of the islands to Japan. The two powers enjoyed a 
“honeymoon” period throughout the 1970s and 80s, characterized by Japan’s 
generous official development assistance (totaling 30 billion USD), low 
interest loans, and other forms of assistance to the impoverished neighbor, in 
addition to signing the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in 1979.116  One 
critical component to this stability can be attributed to China’s official policy 
on the islands since 1972, which had been a “gentleman’s agreement” to 
shelve the sovereignty debate until future generations could solve it 
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peacefully.117 However, the island china also possesses great economic and 
strategic value. For its part, Chinese naval analysts consider control of the 
islands as “critical to accessing the Pacific Ocean.”118 For Japan’s part, the 
islands offer a platform for monitoring Chinese activities in the ECS119 as well 
as security for the oil that travels its waterways. Economically, the ECS is 
believed to possess “large hydrocarbon deposits,” 60 to 100 million barrels of 
oil, and 1 to 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.120 As a result, neither can agree 
on their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and China refuses to allow an 
international body to adjudicate on the issue.121 The crisis was sparked when 
the governor of Tokyo announced intent to “purchase” the islands from a 
private owner, sending the Chinese media into a frenzy and drawing the ire of 
Beijing. In an attempt to “preempt” the governor’s purchase, the Japanese 
government bought the islands in September 2012, “nationalizing” them.122 
This purchase would set off a spiral of actions that would bring the two 
countries to the brink of war.  
 
117 See Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Gezhi Zhengyi, Gongtong Kaifa [Shelve 
Dispute, Seek Joint Development],” www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm. 
118 See Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the 
Early Twenty-First Century”, Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2006). 
119 International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the 
Rocks, Part of Asia” Report N°245, April 8 
2013,  https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-
the-rocks.pdf, 1 
120 U.S. Energy Information Administration “East China Sea,” Report. 25 September, 2012.  
121 International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters,” 2-3. 
122 International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters,” 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-





1.2 China’s Domain of Actions: Determining TSI Status in Terms of 
Gains or Losses 
 
The purpose of applying prospect theory to analyze this case study is to 
determine whether the China’s nuclear coercion (dependent variable) differs 
or coincides with the predictions of prospect theory along China’s domain of 
actions (independent variable). First, I examine China’s domain of actions, 
that is, whether China perceives itself to be located in a domain of gains or 
losses. Second, I examine policy options available to Beijing during the crisis. 
Here, I identify available policy options and determine their risk propensity 
relative to the status of China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity. Third, I 
evaluate the risk propensity of China’s actual policy choices, either risk-
acceptant or risk-averse. Finally, I describe the outcome of China’s actual 
decision, including implications, reasons why other policies why other options 
were not chosen, and how it is consistent with prospect theory. Here, analysis 
is based upon the relationship between domain and risk, not the success or 
failure of China’s behavior. As McDermott notes, the “purpose of case study 
[in prospect theory] is to document that domain and framing can have a 
profound and predicable… effect on the substance and content of decision-
making under conditions of risk.123  
 
 





1.3 Threat Perception – High 
 
Walt measures aggregate power by a state’s total resources, including 
population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess.124 
These four measurements of power reflect the aggregate power a state wields 
in terms of the threat it can pose to others; Walt writes, “states with great 
power have the capacity to either punish enemies or reward friends. By itself, 
therefore, a state’s aggregate power may provide a motive for balancing…”125 
Next, threat perception is influenced by geographic proximity. The logic here 
is simple: nearer states “pose a greater threat than those that are far away.”126 
In other words, the closer a state is, the greater its ability to project power and 
threaten. Conversely, power projection decreases with distance and threat 
declines. Threat perception is also affected by the offensive power of a state. 
On offensive capability, Walt asserts that “states with large offensive 
capabilities are more likely to provoke… than those that are incapable of 
attacking because of geography, military posture, something else.” 127 Walt 
reasons that offensive power provokes because it possesses the ability to 
“threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state…” and can be 
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measured by a state’s capacity to amass large, mobile military capabilities.128 
Offensive capabilities, therefore, provoke and give nearby states strong 
incentive to act. Finally, the level of a state’s aggressive intentions greatly 
impacts threat perception. Walt argues that “[t]he more aggressive or 
expansionist a state appears to be, the more likely it is to trigger” a response.129  
 
Aggregate Power – Low 
 
China is one of the largest countries in the world, both in total land size and 
population, as well as one of the most powerful economies in world history. 
From 2011 to 2014, the year before and after the ECS crisis, China was still 
much a manufacturing and industrial powerhouse, experiencing high growth 
and surpassing Japan’s economy in terms of GDP in 2010 (see figure 7) to 
become the world’s second largest economy. 130  Even in 2012, China’s 
economy was nearly 25% larger than Japan’s economy.131 According to an 
economic survey of Japan by the OECD in April 2013, however, Japan’s 
economy slowed to a crawl following the 2008 global financial crisis and 2011 
Great East Japan Earthquake, stagnating growth.132  
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Second, in terms of population, Japan’s economic productive or 
military mobilization capacities are far weaker than China’s. While China 
already had a population over 1 billion, Japan’s population remained stagnant 
120 million (see figure 8). Combined with the country’s stagnant economic 
growth aging population,133 Japan does not have a large enough population to 
pose a serious threat to China. In terms of its impact on Japan’s aggregate 
power in relation to China’s threat perception, this factor likely plays only a 
small role in China’s threat perception. 
Despite Japan’s tech and car-making industry prowess and 
comparative economic maturity (Japan still possesses a greater GDP per 
capita), the world’s third largest economy is less powerful and less stable than 
China’s economy. In terms of the effects of economic power on aggregate 
military power, China can also outproduce Japan across the military spectrum, 
and it is: China is replacing the US as Asia’s military titan in large part due to 
its economic prowess.134 Even if Japan could match China’s economic power, 
Japan does not have a dedicated military-industrial base as a result of the 
constraints Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution places on the size and nature 
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of the country’s military in addition to self-imposed defense equipment export 
bans.135   
Figure 7: China vs. Japan GDP Comparison 
 
 





Figure 8. China vs. Japan: Population Comparison 
Finally, aggregate power is measured by Japan’s military capabilities 
and capacities. While China does indeed surpass Japan’s Self-Defense Forces 
(JSDF) in terms of quantity, the JSDF edges out the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) in terms of the quality of forces. Chinese analysts were aware of this 
reality before and after the crisis. As one PLA writing demonstrates, China is 
concerned that the Japan’s growing military capabilities will exceed “…the 
need of self-defense and will acquire an offensive posture. A Japanese military 
arming to the teeth will once again let the world’s peace-loving people see the 
shadow of militarism.”136 China is also concerned about Japan’s optimism for 
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military success against China, as demonstrated by China’s admission of the 
superiority of its Air force as well as the strong response to an October 2012 
JSDF naval war simulation that predicted Japan would destroy China’s 
Eastern Fleet.137 Importantly, the US-Japan military alliance tips the scales in 
Japan’s favor (see figure 9).  Japan’s overall military capabilities are 
buttressed by the world’s most powerful military and this factors heavily into 
China’s threat perception, evidenced by Chinese fears over a US military 
alliance system policy of containment.138 However, because of the failure of 
the size of Japan’s economy, population, and technological prowess to 
contribute greatly toward China’s threat perception of the country, Japan’s 
aggregate power is not a significant factor in China’s threat perception in the 
ECS crisis.  
 
Geographic proximity – High 
 
Geographic proximity can be measured by the relative distance between 
Japan’s territory and the Chinese mainland, relative to China’s neighbors as 
well as the number of territorial disputes and overlapping borders. Distance 
plays a subtle yet powerful role in threat perception. According to Walt, 
nearby states “pose a greater threat than those that are far away.” In other 
words, the closer a state is to another, the greater its ability to project power 
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and therefore, to threaten. Conversely, power projection decreases with 
distance and threat declines. The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are located 
410 km from Japan's nearest population center in Naha, 330 km from China’s 
nearest population center in Wenzhou, and 170 km from Taipei. Additionally, 
although China does not share a land border with Japan, these historical and 
geographic neighbors have dozens of competing territorial claims in the East 
and South China Seas, as well as overlapping EEZs and ADIZs. Consequently, 
Japan’s ability to project power, and therefore the threat it can pose to China, 
is significant. 
 
Offensive Capabilities – High 
 
Despite the constraints that Article 9 places on its military power, Japan has 
proven adept at reinterpreting its constitutional shackles to create a world-class 
military in all but name. According to Walt, “states with large offensive 
capabilities are more likely to provoke…” because offensive power has the 
ability to threaten sovereignty and territorial integrity. Offensive power 
includes the capacity to amass large, mobile military capabilities. Because of 
the maritime nature of the ECS dispute, I focus solely on the offensive naval 
capabilities Japan can bring to bear in a territorial dispute to represent Japan’s 
offensive power. In this respect, Japan is formidable. 
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First, Japan controls five times more ocean area than China and has 
been a global maritime power for a century.139 Second, Japan’s Coast Guard, 
a “quasi-military force”140, while numerically inferior to China’s naval and 
maritime forces, are quantitatively superior.141 Japan’s navy was one of the 
most formidable during the time of the dispute, having “the strongest navy and 
air force in Asia except for the U.S.,” according to defense analyst Larry 
Wortzel.142 This is further evidenced by Japan’s belief, and China’s concern, 
that it can destroy China’s East Sea Fleet with only minimal losses.143 But any 
discussion of Japan’s military capabilities necessarily involves the US-
Japanese military alliance: Chinese strategists and PLA officials see the ECS 
crisis as fundamentally a contest between the US and China. 144 While JSDF 
are too small to contain China alone, their offensive capabilities augmented by 
the US-Japanese military alliance are. With US navy capabilities, Japan is able 
to overcome its numerical inferiority and win naval engagements 
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decisively.145 As a result, Japan’s offensive capabilities pose great threat to 
China’s military and therefore plays a large role in China’s threat perception. 
 
Aggressive Intentions – High 
 
Finally, aggressive intentions can be measured by the perceptions of the 
Chinese public, its leaders, and the strategic community’s perceptions about 
the threat Japan poses to China’s core interests; this measure of threat level 
will establish a connection between physical threats and subjective fears, thus 
reflecting threat level as an appropriate domain of action. As mentioned earlier, 
Chinese strategists and PLA officials see the ECS crisis as fundamentally a 
contest between the US and China. 146 The US pivot to Asia at the time of the 
crisis gave the US an opportunity to “let Japan out of the cage” according to 
Peng Guangqian of the PLA, ostensibly to contain China. By this logic, the 
US rebalancing and “China threat” theories are designed and directed by the 
US to help Japan remilitarize, allowing the US to reap the benefits of 
instability. 147 In the US’s pursuit of remilitarizing Japan, according to this 
theory, the US provides material military support while encouraging Japan’s 
remilitarization to combat China.148 China also blames the “China threat” 
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theory on Japan, claiming it simply exaggerates China’s intentions to rebuild 
its war capacities.149 Since the end of the Cold War, China has feared Japan’s 
pursuit of greater global influence, its burgeoning nationalism, and its calls for 
a more expansive military doctrine. Furthermore, based on Japan’s past 
behavior, war-time atrocities, and handling of sensitive historical issues,150 
some believe that China could fall back into nationalist militarism or seek to 
halt China’s ascendency by once again attacking China. Chinese strategists 
argue that the JSDF’s behavior, such as arming maritime vessels and 
forcefully evicting Chinese ships from China’s claimed territory, implies that 
Japan is preparing to use military force to resolve the dispute.151  
In sum, analysis of the aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and aggressive intention measurements reveal that 
China perceives Japan’s behavior and intentions as aggressive and dangerous. 
Consequently, China’s threat perception will be considered “high” in the 3-
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1.4 Territorial Authority – Weak 
 
Maritime Military Power – Weak 
 
Territorial authority is measured by both China’s maritime military power 
relative to Japan as well as the status of its administrative control over the 
disputed territory, and is coded as either “weak” or “strong.” As discussed in 
the “offensive capabilities” section above, the naval balance of power in Asia 
leans in favor of Japan. Despite fielding a smaller number of naval forces, 
Japan possesses a higher quality navy as well as the force multiplying power 
of the US-Japan military alliance to buttress it. In the event that conflict broke 
out around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan would likely win a decisive 
naval engagement, Chinese strategists have voiced their concern. As a result, 
China is unable to exert authority over the disputed territory by either 
intimidation or force. At best, Chain can only harass Japan’s fishing and 
maritime vessels, which it does regularly. Consequently, China’s territorial 
authority with respect to maritime military power is weak. 
 
Administrative Control – Weak 
 
In the case of the East China Sea crisis, Japan has exercised de facto control 
over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands since 1972 because it exercises 
administrative control over the territory. Additionally, scholars have long 
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considered Japan to be the authority over the islands.152 While both China and 
Japan have made their intentions and will to act as a sovereign over the islands 
clear, such as submitting claims to the UN, naming the islands, drawing maps, 
and announcing territorial borders and zones, only Japan has demonstrated 
“adequate exercise of sovereignty” over the islands through legislative and 
administrative measures. And while China regularly tries to alter the status 
quo by repeatedly aggressive incursions into Japan’s claimed territory, Japan 
has successfully repelled them and administer the islands without genuine fear 
of losing that ability. Some examples of Japan’s exercising sovereignty 
include governing the islands pursuant to Japanese national law, repelling 
illegal incursions, and arresting intruders,153 to name a few.  
In sum, Japan exercises sovereignty and has the greater ability to 
enforce its sovereignty claims over the disputed islands than does China. Thus, 
it can be said that Japan possess “strong” authority over the islands while 
China possesses “weak” authority over the islands. Within the 3-factor TSI 
prospect theory model, this places China in a domain of losses and is reflected 
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Severity of Crisis – High 
 
To measure the level of crisis severity, I use established measures employed 
by several prospect theory models in terms of China’s crisis management 
behavior, 154  that is, the level of violence or potential violence, measured 
either high or low. If a crisis involves direct violence or threats of violence, it 
can be coded as “high” in severity. High severity crises are characterized by a 
heighted probability of military conflict, whereas low severity crises are not.  
 The ECS crisis is rife with threats of violence, both implicit and 
explicit. From China’s rapid testing of nuclear-capable missiles to fiery calls 
for military action by PLA generals,155 to Japan’s plans to shoot down Chinese 
UAVs and firing warning shots at Chinese vessels, the potential for 
catastrophic miscalculation and military escalation was considerable. Zhang 
portrays the seriousness of the crisis when he wrote that, “when asked about 
the difference between the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes and the Scarborough 
Shoal crisis, one Chinese scholar gave an interesting analogy − China saw 
itself as the victim in both crises: China was robbed by the Philippines in the 
Scarborough Shoal crisis but felt raped by Japan in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
one.”156 Therefore, while the dispute did not become a military conflict, it 
possessed considerable potential to turn into one and is coded as a high 
 
154 He, China's Crisis Behavior, 37. 
155 Zhang, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, 100. 
156 Ibid, 123.  
 
 80 
severity crisis. In the 3-factor TSI Prospect theory model, a high severity crisis 
will be denoted with a (–) symbol at the bottom of figures 2. 
 
Prospect Theory Predictions: A Risk-Acceptant Posture 
 
Based on my analysis of the three territorial sovereignty and integrity 
measurement, I determined that China perceived a HIGH level of threat, 
possessed a WEAK territorial authority, and the dispute was a HIGH severity 
crisis. This outcome is represented in Figure 2, cell 3 below. 
 
Figure 2. 3-Factor TSI Prospect Theory Model – High Severity Crisis 
High severity crisis (–)                     Aggregate = (–)  
 
*Each cell represents China’s domain of actions in relation to its TSI status level, 
measured from Lowest, Low, High, Highest. Cell 3 demonstrates that when TSI status 
is very low, China finds itself in a domain of losses and according to PT is more likely 




 Threat Perception 
 













Sovereignty &  
Integrity 
 













Sovereignty &  
Integrity 
 




According to the model, when China’s threat perception of Japan is HIGH (–), 
its authority over the disputed territory WEAK (–), and the severity of the 
crisis HIGH (–), China is in a domain of losses. Note that the value of each 
variable is weighed equally. When the values of each variable are combined 
(represented by either a – or a + sign), the aggregated effects of all three factors 
on TSI is negative (three negative signs). This demonstrates that China’s TSI 
status is the “lowest” possible, reflecting a tremendous perceived threat to 
China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity. Based on these measurements, 
Beijing was in a more extreme domain of losses than any of the other seven 
scenarios and therefore, the 2012-2013 ECS crisis was a severely threatening 
position for China to be in: China perceived its situation to not only be 
disadvantageous, but dire.  
 
Beijing’s Decision: Implicit Nuclear Deterrence and a Full Spectrum 
Coercive Strategy  
 
According to prospect theory’s predictions, China, perceiving itself in a 
disadvantageous position framed by a high threat perception and fear of attack, 
feeling itself possessing weak authority and control over the dispute, and 
pressured by the considerable potential for military conflict, should behave in 
a risk-acceptant manner to reverse its losses. Based on the foreign policy 
behavior typology of Figure 1, Beijing is likely to employ either diplomatic or 
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military coercion, or a combination of the two. This process is visualized in 
Figure 4. Are prospect theory’s predictions correct? More importantly, based 
on my hypotheses, China is more likely to engage in nuclear coercion during 
times of great threat to, and insecurity regarding, the nation’s territorial 
sovereignty and integrity. In other words, when Chinese leaders perceive the 
nation to be in a dire position in relation to the status of the country’s TSI 
status, decision-makers are willing to reverse losses by adopting more extreme 
positions, such as nuclear threats, to resolve the dispute favorably.  
In terms of policy options available to Chinese leaders and their 
respective risk propensities, China could have chosen full accommodation to 
de-escalate the situation. This would likely have involved limiting actions to 
official protest and keeping the media out. However, this was unlikely as 
China’s leaders and media had already dug their heels in on the issue, with 
Wen Jiabao stating emphatically that “China will never yield an inch on the 
sovereignty issue.”157 For the same reason, conditional accommodation to de-
escalate was equally as unlikely. The crisis centered around China’s core 
national interest and felt slighted by Japan’s attempt to upset the status quo. 
Feeling compelled to punish Japan for its actions, China would likely choose 
more risk-acceptant policies that escalated the crisis in order to force change 
or punish. Diplomatically, China could levy sanctions in hopes of pressuring 
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China to apologize or reverse its nationalization purchase of the islands. 
Alternatively, China could escalate the crisis further and engage in a game of 
brinkmanship to dissuade China from exercising the control it got used to 
around the islands by threatening war or creating the conditions for 
unmanageable conflict to provoke Japan into one, validating China’s concerns 
and justifying its harsh response. What did China actually do?  
China responded swiftly and severely, employing both diplomatic and 
military coercion. First, the Foreign Ministry called the purchase “illegal and 
invalid” and theft of Chinese territory;158 a Defense Minister stated that the 
Chinese military “reserves the right to take further actions,”159 and violent 
anti-Japanese protests erupted nationwide, damaging Japanese shops.160 Next, 
Beijing threatened economic sanctions, canceled state visits, ordered boycotts 
of tourism to Japan, refused to attend the annual International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank meetings hosted by Tokyo, and announced the demarcation 
of its territorial waters in the disputed area.161  
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The Japanese and Chinese governments continued to trade barbs and 
threats for the next year, but the situation quickly spilled over into the military 
domain. Immediately following the Japanese government’s purchase of the 
islands, China began conducting combat drills in the Yellow Sea and 
dispatched regular maritime patrols into the contiguous waters around the 
islands162 to challenge Japan’s control. Combined with China’s new naval and 
maritime military reorganization163  as well as its willingness to engage in 
risky naval/air encounters, the situation seemed to be on the path toward 
spiraling out of control. According to experts, however, China’s behavior 
reflected a “well-planned campaign with multi-agency coordination and high-
level decision-making.”164 A number of close calls raised the international 
profile of the dispute. The crisis reached its fever pitch from October to 
December 2013, when a combination of coercive threats, naval and airspace 
encounters, dangerous radar lock-on incidents, in addition to the suspension 
of communication channels, threatened to send the states careering toward 
conflict.165  
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In October, the Japanese government approved a plan to shoot down 
drones violating its airspace, as Chinese drones had begun to conduct 
surveillance around the islands.166 China responded with fiery resolution that 
escalated the crisis: the downing of one of its drones would constitute “an act 
of war,” and Beijing would respond militarily. In November 2013, the 
situation intensified when China announced the delineation of its air defense 
identification zone (ADIZ) in the ECS, overlapping with Japan’s ADIZ.167 
This action sharply increased the danger the crisis posed by creating the 
conditions where the risk of collision could escalate out of control. Finally, in 
retaliation for Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, which 
caused a considerable deterioration in already poor bilateral relations, China 
announced two preconditions to normalize diplomatic ties: 1. that Japan 
recognize the existence of the islands dispute, which it refused to do as a matter 
of policy; and 2. that Japanese leaders promise to no longer visit Yasukuni 
shrine.168  Throughout the latter half of 2012 into December 2013, China 
probed Japan’s defense of the islands with repeated air and sea incursions. The 
sudden high frequency of air and sea incidents between the two created dozens 
of opportunities for accident, increasing the risk of an accident, escalation and 
unintended military conflict. However, likely in a bid to avert war, China 
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would employ an intimation tactic to dissuade Japan from meeting China’s 
provocations head on. 
 
1.5 Upping the Ante – China’s Use of Implicit Nuclear Threats 
 
Implicit Verbal Threats 
First, in response to the JSDF’s October 2012 war simulation game, PLA Ge
neral Luo Yuan commented that China could possibly employ nuclear weapo
ns to prevent the destruction of its East China Sea and North Sea naval fleets.
169 Zhang argues that Yuan’s comment was likely designed to “neutralize 
possible Japanese impulses to escalate the crisis” after predicting success 
based on the simulation. Second, PLAN Admiral Yin Zhuo warned, in the 
context of Japan’s possible decision to allow the US to base nuclear weapons 
on its territory, “Japan has only 300,000 square kilometers of land. If attacked 
by nuclear weapons, this nation will no longer exist.”170 Third, Chinese Rear 
Admiral Li Jie told media that the “debut of China’s nuclear submarines is 
also designed to send a warning to countries that are now provoking China: If 
you dare to shoot first, you will have to consider the consequences.”171 
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Throughout July and August 2012, China tested its newest strategic and 
nuclear capable weapons systems “at an unusually rapid rate.” 172  These 
included nuclear capable DF-41, JL-2, and DF-31As. As for intent, Zhang 
argues that “given the broader context, the frequency, and the timing of the 
tests, which just preceded Japan’s island nationalization decision, they could 
not have been designed for pure testing purposes. They represented China’s 
nuclear signaling. In fact, it was the first time that China had tested its new 
DF-41 ICBM, which is supposed to be the most powerful Chinese strategic 
missile due to its reported ability of carrying up to 10 independently guided 
warheads.”173  Additionally, a Hong Kong newspaper used by China as a 




First, Chinese propaganda on the PLA Second Artillery’s new nuclear-capable 
tactical missiles were positioned across Chinese media throughout the second 
half of 2012, at the height of the crisis.174 Additional context helps to establish 
intention. The brigade’s primary purpose was conventional military warfare, 
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whereas tactical nuclear weapons not only change their mission which is big 
news by itself, but they hint at changes to China’s nuclear posture. Tactical 
nuclear weapons are used for deterring both conventional and nuclear wars 
and have more battlefield utility than high-yield nuclear bombs. This move 
seemingly lowers the nuclear threshold for the sake of enhancing China’s 
deterrence strategy.175 Second, in response to Japan’s approval of a plan to 
shoot down China’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in October 2012, Beijing 
declared any such move an act of war.176 Several leading Chinese newspaper 
also simultaneously published front-page news about China’s newly 
operational nuclear submarine forces, the type 094, equipped with nuclear JL-
2 missiles. This is corroborated by the verbal threat above, made by Rear 
Admiral Li Jie who said explicitly that the announcement was meant as a 
warning to Japan’s plan to shoot down Chinese UAVs.177 This interpretation 
is further corroborated by the fact that overseas China news mouthpieces made 
the same connection.178 Finally, Chinese media reported that China’s DF-25 
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According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, in July 2013, China conducted 
its first military flight through the Miyako Strait, a strategically important 
waterway between Okinawa and Miyako Island. 180  Most importantly, in 
September, China conducted its first long-range bomber flights through Strait 
with several nuclear capable H-6 bombers flying through the Strait then back 
into the East China Sea. Japan sees this as nuclear signaling because Japan has 
identified the H-6 nuclear capable bombers as part of China’s nuclear deterrent 
as far back as 2007.181  
 
Evidence of Nuclear Coercion 
 
How do we know China intended to threaten possible nuclear attack with its 
signaling? For example, what if China was simply testing those missiles based 
on schedules made before the crisis was ignited?  First, we must determine 
how intent in measured. Some scholars, like Mearsheimer, even argue that 
“intentions are essentially unknowable and thus only capabilities matter.182 
Among some of the reasons that it is argued state’s intentions are difficult to 
discern include psychological and cognitive biases of leaders 183 , lack of 
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complete information 184 , or general ambiguity, to name a few. 185  Still, 
intentions play a central role in “threat perception, deterrence, and the 
outbreak of war.”186 Without the ability to read an opponents’ mind, states 
must interpret messages and intentions from signaling behavior. Intent is often 
determined by interpreting the costliness and clearness of the signal, to derive 
sincerity and truthfulness of the message.187 In international law: “sometimes 
intent means purpose and sometimes it means knowledge.”188  One theory 
asserts that a state can be said to act with intent when it consciously disregards 
the risk associated with its actions and the logical outcome of those actions.189 
Another theory asserts that a state acts with intent when it possesses 
knowledge regarding how its behavior could be perceived,190 that is, engaging 
in an action that one knows carries a particular meaning beforehand.  
In terms of China’s nuclear signaling behavior, intent can be derived 
from establishing that Beijing understands (i.e. has knowledge of) what the 
signal means or can be construed to mean. For example, if China interprets a 
US flight of nuclear-capable B2 bombers or the deployment of aircraft carries 
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through the Taiwan Straits as carrying a message of military flexing, saber-
rattling, or intimidation, but then later engages in similar behavior, we can 
infer that China understood that its behavior carried a similar message and 
suggesting a reasonable level of intent. China does, in fact, understand that the 
signals sent in the evidence provided earlier are nuclear signals carrying 
implicit nuclear threats because it possesses prior knowledge regarding that 
type of behavior. China’s knowledge comes from the fact that it has faced 
threats of nuclear attack on at least six separate instances. For example, 
President’s Harry S. Truman191 and Dwight D. Eisenhower192 each threatened 
to use any means necessary, including nuclear weapons, to resolve the Korean 
War and China’s plans to invade the island of Quemoy, respectively. More 
specifically, China observed when the U.S. dispatched over 20 nuclear-armed 
B-36 bombers to Japan’s Kadena air force base in 1953 in an attempt to 
intimidate Chinese and North Korean forces to accept an armistice, and we 
know this messaged was received because the US invited media to report on 
the bomber’s arrival and China accepted terms shortly after.193  Similarly, 
China understands the gravity of a nuclear show of force as evidenced by its 
reaction to President Bill Clinton’s ordering two nuclear-capable aircraft 
carriers and a fleet through the Taiwan Strait during the 1996 Taiwan Strait 
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Crisis.194 On the other side of the fence, China has engaged in nuclear deterrent 
threats in the past. During the same crisis, China also implicitly threatened a 
nuclear attack, this one on Los Angeles. In 1996, a senior PLA official 
communicated to Assistant Secretary of Defense Freedman that China would 
proceed with its military bombardment of Taiwan because the U.S. “care more 
about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,” 195  and that China was 
prepared to “sacrifice ‘millions of men’ and entire cities’ to assure the unity 
of China.” 196  Therefore, China employed nuclear signals, such as verbal 
threats by officials and shows of force, that it understood could be perceived 
as nuclear threats, even by Beijing’s own definition as it had experienced in 
the past. 
 
1.6 China’s Crisis Behavior: Results of Analysis 
 
Prospect theory posits that when a crisis’ outcome is framed in terms of loss, 
that is, when leaders “clearly perceive a tangible loss” relative to their 
reference point, they will take “considerable risks” to reverse those losses and 
return to their preferred status quo. 197 According to my territorial sovereignty 
and integrity prospect model, China perceived itself in a domain of losses in 
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each of the three key measurement of TSI: crisis severity, territorial authority, 
and threat perception. The model predicts that China should adopt a coercive 
strategy against Japan based upon the risk propensity table. Performing a 
congruence test with my five hypotheses will prove whether the prospect 
theory model accurately reflects the reality. 
First, the TSI prospect theory model predicted that when China’s TSI 
status is framed in a domain of losses, Beijing is more likely behave in a risk-
acceptant way and adopt a coercive policy. The empirical record of the ECS 
crisis proves this hypothesis to be true. Based on the evidence reviewed, China 
engaged in a two-pronged diplomatic and military coercive strategy, 
coinciding with the model’s predictions. However, this paper focuses on a 
specific type of coercion, nuclear coercion. The purpose of this research is to 
identify the conditions under which China chooses to engage in nuclear 
coercion. Second, the model predicted that the lower the TSI status in a domain 
of losses, the riskier the policy China will choose. The model proves this to be 
true. While located in a “low” TSI status, China engaged in increasingly risky 
foreign policy behavior, such as military coercion. Finally, I hypothesized that 
if located in the “lowest” TSI status possible, China would be more likely to 
engage in nuclear coercion. This hypothesis was also proven to be true: when 
Beijing perceives itself to be in a severely disadvantageous position in terms 
of its territorial sovereignty and integrity status, decision-makers are more 
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receptive to engaging in dangerous escalatory policies, such as implicit 
nuclear threats, to reverse their losses and force a return to the status quo.  
Nuclear coercion offered Chinese leaders the greatest pay off if it 
succeeded, as the leaders faced the prospect of recoupling all losses and 
returning the islands dispute to the status quo ante. However, it also possessed 
the greatest risk of failure and could have escalated the crisis to an 
unmanageable state – but Beijing was willing to make that gamble. In the case 
of the 2012-2013 ECS crisis, the success of China’s nuclear deterrent threats 
is difficult to determine. By largely ignoring China’s threats, whether nuclear, 
conventional, or otherwise, and relying on the US military alliance, Japan’s 
resolve was strong and Tokyo was unlikely to be intimidated. If, on the other 
hand, Beijing meant to signal its seriousness and prevent Japan from, for 
example, shooting down a Chinese UAV over disputed waters and potentially 
sparking a war, China’s threats worked. 
 
2. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 2014-2018 
 
2.1 Crisis Background 
 
China and Japan have claimed undisputed sovereignty over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands for decades and tensions over them have oscillated 
over the last 50 years. However, because Japan has controlled three of the 
eight islands in dispute since 1972, China’s policy has been to shelve the 
sovereignty debate until future generations can solve it peacefully, that is, so 
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long as the status quo remained intact. The first major escalation in tensions 
over the island occurred in 2010 when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with 
a Japanese Coast Guard vessel. Japanese authorities arrested the boat captain 
and delayed his release, causing harsh backlash and protests in China. After 
the captain was released, tensions subsided but it left an impression on China 
who believed Tokyo was trying to change the status quo, stoking the fires of 
nationalism. The 2012-2013 crisis was ignited when the governor of Tokyo 
attempted to “buy” the islands from a private owner, sending the Chinese 
media into a frenzy and drawing the ire of Beijing. In an attempt to “preempt” 
the governor’s purchase, the Japanese government bought the islands in 
September 2012, thereby “nationalizing” them.198 The purchase set off a spiral 
of actions that sent the countries careering toward conflict. Immediately after 
the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands, China began conducting 
combat drills in the Yellow Sea and dispatched regular maritime patrols into 
the contiguous waters around the islands199 to challenge Japan’s control in 
what some experts called a “well-planned campaign with multi-agency 
coordination and high-level decision-making.”200   
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A period of relief surfaced, however, in early 2014, and the year would 
mark a monumental shift in terms of the potential for armed conflict. First, the 
2014 Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), signed into effect on 
April 22nd, 2014 by the naval chiefs of over 20 states, including China, Japan, 
and the US. The CUES is a non-legally binding agreement that establishes 
protocols for how navies should communicate during unexpected or casual 
encounters.201 The agreement was expected to reduce tensions by minimizing 
the risk of miscalculation, thus the likelihood of military conflict, and 
ultimately, to improve regional stability. Third, in a June 2014 press 
conference with Japan’s Minister of Defense, Onodera, who announced that 
China and Japan had reached an agreement on the contents of the China-Japan 
maritime communication mechanism. 202  And in September 2014, the two 
countries agreed to restart the 2012 mechanism meetings suspended at the 
onset of the crisis, including meetings with representatives from all maritime 
agencies to establish crisis communication mechanisms like a crisis hotline.203 
Finally, a summit between Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the 
November 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 
Beijing provided a pivotal platform for Sino-Japanese relations to move in a 
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new direction. The resumption of top-level bilateral exchanges for the first 
time in years led to a four-point principled agreement that established mutual 
intentions to proceed with crisis communication mechanisms and other 
confidence building measures.204 Specifically, the two sides sought to create 
an emergency hotline, establish annual meetings, and determine a common 
radio frequency around the area.205 More recently, Xi and Abe took a pledge 
to move their country’s relations in a “new historic direction” in 2018, while 
signing multibillion-dollar economic deals, marking the first official meeting 
between the two leaders in seven years.206  
However, this period of détente did not put an end to the occurrence of 
near crisis events. For Japan’s part, Tokyo sought to reduce tensions and avoid 
a conflict while simultaneously pushing forward with a multi-phase plan to 
militarize islands throughout the East China Sea. From 2013 to 2016, Japan 
installed a radar station on Yonaguni island—just south of the Senkakus—
deployed troops to the Amami Islands near Okinawa, planned amphibious 
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military responses via military drills, and improved its patrolling by launching 
ten new Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) 1,500-ton ships.207 In April 2014, Japan 
finally finished installing a military station on Yonaguni island, increasing the 
Japanese Self Defense Force’s surveillance and military projection capabilities 
toward mainland China.208 Furthermore, from 2014 to 2015 Japan invested 
more than 12 billion USD in missile defense systems and their components, 
such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile 
defense system, X-band radar, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile battery 
systems for installment in key waterways throughout the ECS.209 In 2015 
Japan deployed thousands of JSDF troops throughout the ECS, who were 
tasked with building ani-ship and anti-aircraft missile batteries along nearly 
200 islands spanning 1,400 km of the area to monitor and counter China’s 
growing maritime influence.210 To reach the Pacific Ocean, China will have to 
sail within the line of sight of Japan’s missiles and surveillance equipment. 
Additionally, Japan announced plans to increase JSDF personnel in the ECS 
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to nearly 10,000 between the years of 2014 to 2019.211 According to Satoshi 
Morimoto, a former Japanese defense minister, Japan considers the “first 
island chain”, which runs along the ECS, to be crucial toward maintaining the 
military balance. 212  In sum, Japan’s increased defense spending, military 
installation construction projects, defense cooperation with states in territorial 
dispute with China, and the deployment of thousands of JSDF personnel 
within the ECS have in fact upped the military ante around the islands in 
dispute 
Despite recent pledges for cooperation between the leaders as well as 
talk of promising confidence building measures from both camps, the dispute 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands remains a key obstacle to better relations 
beyond surface level engagement. Misperception and miscalculation caused 
by inflammatory rhetoric or a minute of careless behavior still has the 
opportunity to send the countries careering towards an unintended conflict, a 
limited military engagement, or a regional war involving the United States. As 
a result, Sino-Japanese relations are believed to be vulnerable to destabilizing 
activity in the East China Sea and indeed, observers still consider the islands 
dispute a flashpoint for potential military conflict. While a period of détente 
replaced the status quo in 2014 and has remained intact since, both China and 
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Japan have continued to up the military ante around the disputed territory 
without sparking a more explosive crisis.  
 
2.3 China’s Domain of Actions: Threat Perception – High 
 
Aggregate Power – Low 
 
Conditions from the period of 2014 – 2018 are similar to those outlined in the 
first case study on the 2012-2013 ECS crisis, except that the disparity between 
the power of their economies grew even larger (see Figure 7). By 2015, 
China’s GDP was twice that of Japan’s and in 2018 was nearly three times the 
size of its neighbor’s economy.213 Over the last five years, Japan’s population 
has also remained stagnant (see Figure 8) and the Japanese government 
continues to suffer from an aging society. Militarily, China is catching up to 
Japan in terms of technology and already possesses a defense budget four 
times larger.214 Japan has also failed to match or check China’s rapid military 
growth, and while the US military alliance ensures a level playing field for the 
time being, China is beginning to edge out its opponent by outspending and 
outproducing Japan across the military spectrum.215 Thus, as a measurement 
of threat perception, China is likely not intimidated by Japan’s aggregate 
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power and consequently does not consider it a significant part of is threat 
perception calculus in terms of TSI status. 
 
Geographic proximity – High 
 
Just as in the 2012-2013 ECS crisis, proximity plays a large part in China’s 
threat perception of Japan. As noted earlier, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are 
located only 410 km from Japan's nearest population center in Naha and 330 
km from China’s nearest population center in Wenzhou. For reference, the 
Japanese mainland, from Fukuoka to Shanghai, is barely 800 kilometers from 
China’s claimed undisputed territory around the islands. As in the previous 
crisis, the dozens of competing territorial claims in the East and South China 
Seas and overlapping EEZs and ADIZs complicate competition. As a result, 
Japan’s ability to project power and threaten China’s core territorial interests 
is significant: threat perception is high. 
 
Offensive Capabilities – High 
 
As in the 2012-2013 ECS crisis, Japan’s “quasi-military force” 216 , while 
numerically inferior to China’s naval and maritime forces, are quantitatively 
superior – but this trend has slowed and is now reversing. China’s military 
expenditure exploded from 157 billion USD to 227 billion USD from 2012 to 
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2017217  and Beijing has used those funds to conduct the largest military 
exercises in its history, proceed with a massive nuclear modernization 
program, and commission an aircraft carrier,218 to name a few While still a 
formidable force, the JSDF are not designed to project power and are primarily 
defensive in their military mission, 219  and therefore rely on US military 
alliance more than ever before for offensive capabilities. As a result, Japan’s 
offensive capabilities alone pose less of a threat to China’s military than in the 
past, and although it plays a role in China’s threat perception, China’s 
continued progress mitigates these concerns substantially. However, as noted 
earlier, China sees the territorial dispute as a fundamentally U.S.-related issue 
and the world’s most powerful military continues to tip the scales in Japan’s 
favor due to its unrivaled offensive firepower and conventional capabilities. 
In the event of a limited military conflict in the region, although China could 
pose serious challenges, the U.S. and Japan would likely defeat China 
decisively according to an extensive report by the California-based think tank 
RAND. 220  Therefore, Japan’s offensive capabilities play a large part in 
China’s threat perception.  
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Aggressive Intentions – High 
 
Since the 2012 ECS crisis, China continues to fear Japan’s pursuit of greater 
global influence, its burgeoning nationalism, and its calls for a more expansive 
military doctrine. Indeed, in its 2015 defense White Paper, Beijing referred to 
Japan’s military modernization a “grave concern.”221 For example, regarding 
Japan’s stationing troops and a radar on Yonaguni Island in the ECS, Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying remarked, “Due to historical reasons, 
any of Japan’s military moves will raise concern among Asian countries” and 
“Japan should give a serious explanation for its real intention of building 
military muscle in [the] relevant region.”222 Japan’s past behavior as well as 
the sensitive nature of their shared history remain salient obstacles that will be 
difficult to overcome and as such, China’s perception regarding Japan’s 
intentions remains concerned. Thus, China’s belief about China’s aggressive 
intentions remain a significant consideration in China’s threat perception 
calculus.  
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In sum, analysis of the aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions measurements reveal that 
China perceives Japan’s behavior and intentions as aggressive. Consequently, 
China’s threat perception will be considered “high” in the 3-factor TSI 
prospect theory model and is denoted in figure 2 cells 1 or 3.  
 
2.4 Territorial Authority – Strong 
 
Maritime Military Power – Strong 
 
China's maritime forces have undergone a massive reorganization since 2014, 
propelled by Xi Jinping’s vision of making China a great maritime power. 
Consequently, maritime and naval issues have taken center stage. One general 
remarked that China’s “main security threat comes from the sea,” and warning 
others potential adversaries that “not the slightest harm can come to the core national 
interests,”223 and state media now refer to maritime rights, along with territorial 
sovereignty and integrity, as a “core interest (核心利益),” a phrase normally 
reserved for issues such as Taiwan or domestic stability.224 Indeed, The 2013 
Science of Military Strategy, the PLA Military Academy’s White Paper, has 
codified the military’s new focus moving forward, stating the military’s 
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challenges are “mainly in the sea.”225 As a consequence, budgets for PLAN 
and maritime forces ballooned as their forces have combined. In fact, China’s 
defensive expenditure increased 12% in 2014 alone.226 As a result of these 
efforts, China has begun to not only catch up with Japan but is not “out-
building Japan virtually across the board”, according to Toshi Yoshihara, a 
professor at the US Naval War College.”227 China also began using old naval 
vessels in its Coast Guard, while increasing the tonnage and fire power of its 
ships around the disputed areas from an average of 2,200 tons in 2014 to 3,200 
tons in 2015.228 In late 2015, for instance, China’s Coast Guard entered the 
territorial waters around the disputed islands for the first time with a vessel 
with gun turrets. This would become the norm, as both China and Japan now 
outfit their patrol vessels with increasingly higher caliber weaponry like 37 
mm guns and 76 mm cannons.229  According to Yoshihara, “the maritime 
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balance of power, measured in terms of naval and civilian maritime law 
enforcement capabilities, is shifting in China’s favor.”230  
China’s maritime power relative to the Japan has increased and 
China’s confidence in its ability to control the dispute and challenge Japan’s 
claims have increased. Given these developments, China’s territorial authority 
could be seen as “strong” in terms of maritime military power. However, the 
force multiplying power of the US-Japan military alliance during the period 
of 2014 to 2018 still leans in Japan’s favor in terms of an extended military 
conflict or war. The naval power the U.S. can bring to bear gives the US navy, 
by some estimates, a 10:1 advantage as recently as 2018 because of its 
technological and qualitative superiority.231 In the event that war broke out in 
the ECS, Japan would likely win a decisive naval engagement against the PLA 
Navy. However, in the event of a limited military conflict before the U.S. 
could intervene, Beijing increasingly possesses the advantage. I argue this is 
a more realistic scenario because the probability of a limited military conflict 
is reasonably higher than a regional theatre war involving the U.S. Therefore, 
China is now able to exert more authority over the disputed territory through 
intimidation or force when necessary, despite not administering the islands 
themselves. At the least, China can now control the dispute better than in the 
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past. I believe this point is critical toward understanding China’s growing 
confidence in the status of its territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity –
the dispute should reflect this evolving reality.  China’s confidence can be 
observed in its nearly decades-long harassment of Japanese maritime vessels, 
which it continues to do regularly and in increasing numbers (see Figure 10). 
Consequently, China’s territorial authority with respect to maritime military 
power can be considered strong from China’s perspective. 
 
Administrative Control – Indeterminate 
 
While Japan continues to exercise de facto control over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (and has since 1972), the integrity of Japan’s 
sovereignty claims is under threat. China’s regular air and sea incursions into 
Japan’s claimed waters and airspace may not alter the status quo set by the 
Japanese government’s ‘nationalization’ of the islands, but it severely 
undermines the credibility of Japan’s claim to territorial authority. As 
mentioned previously, one key component of sovereignty is the ability to 
exercise authority by repelling incursions, thus maintaining territorial integrity. 
So long as China continues to successfully prod Japan’s porous defenses, 
territorial integrity cannot credibly be established and it speaks to Japan’s 
ability to defend the islands over the long-run. China is, increasingly, able to 
exert greater authority over the territory (due to the size of its navy and the 
aggressivity of its tactics) through intimidation or force, while Japan is 
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relatively less capable than in the past. China’s growing power and maritime 
tactics have also increased the probability that Japan may have to acknowledge 
the dispute as it continues repeatedly violating Japan’s “undisputed” 
sovereignty over the islands. How often and for how much longer will Japan’s 
sovereignty claims be violated before the debate on whether Tokyo exercises 
“effective” administrative control over the islands begins? In terms of the 
status of China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, Japan’s administrative 
control over the islands can arguably be classified as “indeterminate.” Just as 
China’s confidence in its TSI status and the relative maritime and naval 
balance of power in the ECS evolves, so too should our understanding of the 
current status of the dispute and its trajectory. 
In sum, combined with Japan’s deteriorating ability to respond 
militarily to China in any decisive capacity, the scales are tipping in China’s 
favor in terms of naval military power. I also argue that from 2014 to 2018, 
administrative control can reasonably be seen as indeterminate, as the facts 
are changing rapidly – and not in Japan’s favor. Therefore, it can be argued 
that China possesses a strengthening territorial authority while Japan 
possesses weakening authority over the islands. This relative, not absolute, 
interpretation of territorial authority is valid because China’s behavior is based 
on its own perception of its relative TSI status. Within the 3-factor TSI 
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prospect theory model, this places China in a domain of losses and is reflected 
in figure 2 as cells 3 or 4.  
 
2.5 Severity of Crisis – Low 
 
In terms of direct violence or threats of violence, the ECS dispute from 2014 
to 2018 was not characterized by a high probability of military conflict. 
Although the two powers continue to trade barbs, neither has made threats of 
war, implicit or explicit, and certainly not the rate as was seen in 2012 and 
2013. Despite the number of Chinese naval incursions into Japan’s claimed 
waters around the disputed islands increasing and remaining consistent over 
the last five years, and incidents including allegations of dangerous radar lock-
on incidents, the two powers have found a way to improve ties. From the Code 
of Unplanned Encounters at Sea to the maritime communication mechanism 
dialogue and recent summit between Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe, the two 
countries have both worked toward de-escalating situations instead of 
escalating them. As a result, the period of 2014 to 2018 can be coded as “low” 
in crisis severity as the probability of military conflict was managed well. In 
the 3-factor TSI Prospect theory model, a low severity crisis is denoted with a 








2.6 Prospect Theory Predictions: A Risk-Averse Posture 
 
Based on my analysis of the three territorial sovereignty and integrity 
measurements, I determined that China perceived a HIGH level of threat, 
possessed a STRONG territorial authority, and the crisis possessed a LOW 
level of severity. This outcome is represented in Figure 3, cell 5 below. 
According to the model, when China’s threat perception of Japan is HIGH (–), 
its authority over the disputed territory STRONG (+), and the severity of the 
crisis LOW (+), China is in a domain of gains. When the values of each 
variable are combined (represented by either a – or a + sign), the aggregated 
effects of all three factors on TSI status is positive (two positive signs, one 
negative sign). This demonstrates that China’s TSI status is “high”, reflecting 
a relatively advantageous position in terms of China’s territorial sovereignty 



















Figure 3. 3-Factor TSI Prospect Theory Model – Low Severity Crisis 
 
Low severity crisis (+)                                        Aggregate = (+)  
 
*Each cell represents China’s domain of actions in relation to its TSI status level, 
measured from Lowest, Low, High, Highest. Cell 6 demonstrates that when TSI status 
is high, China finds itself in a domain of gains and according to PT is more likely to 
engage in risk-averse behavior 
 
 
2.7 Beijing’s Decision: A Strategy of Conditional Accommodation to 
Protect Gains 
 
Perceiving itself in an advantageous position, framed by a strong and growing 
confidence in its authority over the dispute, perceiving little potential for 
military conflict, but still concerned about Japan’s aggressive activities, China 
was more likely to behave in a risk-averse manner to deal with the several near 
crisis events in the ECS from 2014 to 2018. As a result, Beijing was most 
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Figure 4. Most importantly, why did China not choose to resolve the dispute 
through coercive intimidation, using tactics like nuclear coercion? Chinese 
leaders had three distinctive policy options available to them: 1.) allow Japan’s 
militarization of the ECS to go unopposed, soften China’s presence in the 
region (including decreasing the regular air and sea incursions into Japan’s 
claimed territory), and pursue normalization of ties 2.) maintain China’s 
activities in the region and voice protest against perceived transgressions by 
Japan while pursuing diplomatic normalization; or 3.) eschew normalization 
to maintain a though approach to the dispute, escalating periodic crises to 
persuade Japan to cease and desist from activities in the ECS.  
The first option is closest to full accommodation and is therefore the 
most risk-averse choice. This option, however, was very unlikely for a few 
reasons. First, China could not allow Japan to ride roughshod over its core 
national interests, namely, its sovereignty claims in other parts of the ECS. 
Neither could Beijing cease its naval and air-based incursions into Japan’s 
EEZ and ADIZ around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands – to do so would cause 
domestic backlash and allow Japan’s attempt to change the status quo cement 
itself. The second option is the middle-of-the-road choice China would 
eventually take – this conditional accommodative approach is assertive and 
de-escalatory without spoiling the gains it worked so hard to acquire over the 
last few years. This option is particularly attractive because failing to 
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normalize relations after top-level diplomatic exchanges would harm relations 
significantly – after national leaders meet, there is nowhere left to go to 
negotiate. Normalizing ties in this way also allowed each party to continue 
their same behaviors in the ECS without losing face. Finally, the third option 
is the riskiest and involves a mix of diplomatic and military coercive policies 
to pressure and punish Japan during critical moments of the dispute between 
2014-2018. Pursuing a coercive, and necessarily escalatory, policy would have 
been unlikely during this period for two reasons. First, both parties wanted to 
avoid war and escalating the crisis to pre-2014 levels would have brought them 
back to the brink. Second, coercion would likely not have worked – if the 
coercion employed in 2012 to 2013 did not work, Japan’s resolve was likely 
higher than China’s willingness to escalate.  
China chose the middle-of-the-road path from 2014 to 2018 and 
adopted a policy of conditional accommodation. In order to avoid losing the 
gains it made by engaging in substantive and high-level diplomatic talks on 
issues from crisis management to trade agreements, thereby avoiding another 
high severity crisis, China maintained its assertive and often times aggressive 
behavior while simultaneously pursuing détente with Japan and neighbors. For 
example, China continued its maritime (and airspace) incursions into Japan’s 
claimed waters to challenge its sovereignty (see Figure 10) and in 2017, 
coordinated the dispatch of between 200 to 300 fishing vessels and 15 Chinese 
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Coast Guard ships to “overwhelm” Japan’s ability to react around the 
islands.232 However,  at the same time, China has not physically enforced its 
2013 ADIZ, 233  and continued dialogue at the working, ministerial, and 
presidential levels. Furthermore, although a news outlet run by the Chinese 
Communist Party insinuated that China could deploy warships to the area if 
necessary,234 instances of fiery rhetoric and threats from officials directed at 
Tokyo are scarce and pale in comparison to those of 2012 or 2013.  
 
2.8 China’s Crisis Behavior: Results of Analysis 
 
According to the 3-factor TSI prospect model, China perceived itself in a 
domain of gains in all of the three key measurements but threat perception. 
The model predicts that China should adopt an accommodative strategy to de-
escalate and protect its gains. Performing a congruence test with my five 
hypotheses will demonstrate whether the prospect theory model accurately 
reflects reality. 
First, the TSI prospect theory model predicted that when China’s TSI 
status is framed in a domain of gains, Beijing is more likely behave in a risk-
averse way and adopt an accommodative policy. The empirical record of the 
 
232 Morris, Lyle J. “The New 'Normal' in the East China Sea”, RAND, February 27, 
2017  https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/02/the-new-normal-in-the-east-china-sea.html 
233 Ibid.  
234 Ben Blanchard, “China Warns Japan against 'Provocation' around Disputed Islets,” 




ECS dispute from 2014 to 2018 lends credence to this hypothesis. Based on 
the evidence reviewed, China engaged in policy of conditional 
accommodation, coinciding with the model’s predictions. Second, the model 
predicted that the higher the TSI status in a domain of gains, the more cautious 
a policy China will choose. The model proves this to be true, too. While 
located in a “high” TSI status, China engaged in increasingly cautious and de-
escalatory foreign policy behavior, like conditional accommodation.  
The purpose of this research, however, is to identify the conditions under 
which China chooses to engage in nuclear coercion over other viable policy 
options. Why wasn’t nuclear coercion employed to deal with Japan in the ECS 
from 2014 to 2018? As noted above, pursuing a coercive policy would have 
been unlikely during this period for two reasons. First, both parties wanted to 
avoid war and escalating the crisis to pre-2014 levels would have brought them 
back to the brink. Second, coercion of any type would not likely have worked 
– if 14 months of coercion, pressure, and implicit nuclear threats had not 
deterred Japan from its path, Chinese leaders surely understood that it was 
unlikely to work now. Alternatively, it can be argued that China’s nuclear 
deterrent threats did work, and were no longer needed. If China’s goal was 
simply to dissuade Japan from escalating crises into full blown military 
conflicts, Beijing succeeded. According to this interpretation, an extremely 
risky policy of nuclear coercion served its purpose and its use again would 
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have been redundant. Finally, according to the 3-factor TSI prospect theory 
model, China perceived itself to be in a relatively advantageous position 
beginning in 2014. As a result, risky policies were no longer necessary to 
improve the status of the country’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, as the 




CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION 
 
1. Summary of Research Objectives, Findings and Implications 
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
The focus of this thesis was to explore China’s post-Cold War use of implicit 
nuclear deterrent threats in territorial disputes. Through the literature review, 
it was established that China’s nuclear signaling was an understudied and 
often ignored subfield of the country’s crisis behavior. Moreover, the review 
established that alternative explanations for China’s crisis behavior, to include 
nuclear signaling, were critically needed and that answering the “when” and 
“why” Beijing chooses certain policies over others under conditions of risk 
and uncertainty was necessary, thus establishing a link between China’s 
nuclear coercion and risky foreign policy crisis decision-making. 
Consequently, the research question endeavored to determine the conditions 
under which China chooses to engage in nuclear coercion. To this end, I 
identified prospect theory as the most appropriate tool for answering the 
research problem and filling this gap in the literature.  
 Through prospect theory, I identified China’s reference point as 
China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, developed several variables to 
measure it, established China’s perceived domain of actions (gains or losses) 
in relation to the country’s TSI status, determined the risk propensity of 
various foreign policy behaviors, and identified two appropriate case studies 
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for analysis. Through a rigorous and novel research design that applied 
prospect theory systematically, I was able to connect TSI status and the risk 
propensity of China’s behavior to demonstrate how important and 
consequential China’s perception of its territorial sovereignty and integrity is 
on its behavior. In this way, I offered a new way to understand an old problem: 
how to predict state decision-making during crises, especially regarding 
whether to escalate or deescalate the crisis. 
 
1.2 Summary of Findings 
 
1. 3-factor TSI Prospect Theory model hypotheses found to be 
accurate. 
2. Territorial Sovereignty & Integrity has an impact on China’s 
behavior during crises. 
3. TSI status is one set of variables that contribute to China’s nuclear 
coercion. 
4. Prospect Theory is useful for explaining and predicating China’s 
crisis behavior. 
First, the hypotheses derived from the 3-factor TSI prospect theory model 
appear to be accurate. Two case studies were analyzed, the 2012-2013 ECS 
crisis and the 2014-2018 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. I first 
hypothesized that when China’s TSI status is framed in a domain of gains, 
Beijing is more likely to choose risk-averse policies. During the 2014-2018 
ECS dispute, China perceived itself to be operating within a domain of 
gains and indeed adopted a risk-averse policy of accommodation in order 
to protect its gains and avoid further losses. Next, I hypothesized that when 
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China’s TSI status is framed in a domain of losses, Beijing is more likely 
to choose a risk-acceptant policy. Consistent with the prediction, case study 
analysis of the 2012-0213 ECS crises demonstrated that Beijing perceived 
itself in a domain of losses and adopted a policy of diplomatic and military 
coercion to reverse its losses. The third hypothesis stated that the higher the 
TSI status in a domain of gains, China will behave more cautiously. 
Consistent with the evidence, China chose conditional accommodation 
when it was placed in a domain of gains (see Figure 3 Cell 5), but did not 
choose a full accommodation policy, which the model predicted would 
instead be taken if China perceived itself in Figure 3, Cell 6.  Next, however, 
I hypothesized that the lower the TSI status in a domain of losses, the riskier 
the policy China would choose. Indeed, the empirical record proves this to 
be true. When located in a “low” or “lowest” TSI status (see Figure 2, Cell 
3), China chose increasingly risky policies, moving from diplomatic to 
military coercion in the 2012-2013 ECS crisis. Finally, I hypothesized that 
when China is located in the “lowest” TSI status, Beijing will engage in the 
more extreme forms of risk-taking behavior, such as employing nuclear 
threats. This hypothesis appears to be accurate: when China’s TSI status 
was the lowest possible, China perceived itself to be in a dire situation and 
chose to use implicit nuclear threats to either bring back the status quo or 
prevent a new one from solidifying. 
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Second, territorial sovereignty & integrity has an impact on China’s 
behavior during crises. The original research question asked, “under what 
conditions does China engage in nuclear coercion?” To answer the question: 
China engages in nuclear coercion when it perceives itself to be in a 
severely disadvantageous position in relation to the status of its territorial 
sovereignty and integrity. In other words, when insecurity about or a 
perceived threat to China’s TSI status exists, China is more likely to employ 
risky, dangerous escalatory policies, such as nuclear threats, to deter further 
loss, recoup its losses, or compel a return to the status quo. Therefore, TSI 
status appears to play a role in China’s decision-making process during 
crises, specifically in territorial disputes. There are a few reasons for the 
prioritization and importance of territorial and sovereignty-related issues. 
First, China considers its sovereignty and territorial integrity to be core 
national interests. As a matter of national security, a state must be able to 
defend its sovereignty claims and maintain the integrity of its borders and 
as M. Taylor Fravel notes, there is a connection between regime insecurity 
and territorial disputes.235 Additionally, Beijing is particularly sensitive to 
issues of sovereignty involving Japan. Due to the complicated and deeply 
rooted historical animosities between the two countries, as well as China’s 
 
235 M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Security and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s 
Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30 (2005): 62. 
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historically better ties to Southeast Asian countries, China was far more 
aggressive with Japan in the ECS than with ASEAN states in the South 
China Sea. Therefore, it is possible that the TSI model is more effective at 
explaining risk-acceptant and risk-averse behavior with adversaries. 
Second, issues of territory are more salient that other issues because they 
are easy to recognize and possession of them provides the occupying state 
with land and sea it can use for military/surveillance, or economic purposes. 
As a result, territorial issues tend to be zero-sum in nature and prone to 
competition, disagreement, and conflict. Third, as a result of the second 
point and because of China’s geographic location being surrounded by 
dozens of countries and being involved in dozens of territorial disputes, 
China has developed policies and strategies for dealing with crises in 
territorial disputes. When China was younger and more insecure, it tended 
to shelve disputes. Now that the country is more powerful, it may be able 
to resolve disputes through the use of force and therefore its behavior must 
take its new power into consideration. 
Third, TSI status is one set of variables that contribute to China’s 
nuclear coercion. First, China chose to employ nuclear coercion during the 
2012-2013 period of the ECS crisis and not the 2014-2018 period. China 
chose nuclear coercion in the first case study because it found itself in a 
severely disadvantageous position in terms of the threat to its TSI status. 
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This was not the case from 2014 to 2018. There are a few reasons for this. 
In 2012, the status quo was turned on its head – when Japan nationalized 
the islands China claims a part of its indisputable sovereign territory, it 
directly threatened not only the physical space that China claimed, but its 
national sovereignty and its pride. Chinese leaders not only felt slighted, 
but also humiliated. If decision makers did not put their foot down during 
this dispute, other states, including Japan could begin ignoring Chinese 
claims or work to alter the status quo on the ground just as Japan did. Lack 
of resolve and assertiveness on this issue would be catastrophic for China’s 
national security. In such position, China was willing to take more risks 
than a typical foreign policy crisis. Next, given Japan’s willingness to trade 
provocations and escalate the situation, the probability of military conflict 
was considerably higher than Beijing likely wanted and the gravity of the 
situation for Chinese leaders led them to consider using nuclear deterrent 
threats for a number of purposes. Although the purpose of the threats are 
impossible to determine for sure, they could have been designed to 1.) 
compelling Japan to give up its claim to the islands,  (very unlikely); 2.) 
compelling Japan to return the dispute to the status quo, retracting its 
nationalization of the islands (unlikely); or 3.) intimidate Japan to signal 
China’s resolve or seriousness, deterring it from escalating situations and 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of unintended military conflict (likely). 
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Second, although any number of variables can and likely do contribute to a 
state’s behavior, the model and case study analysis have proven that 
territorial sovereignty and integrity, as well as its measurements, crisis 
severity, threat perception, and territorial authority, play a considerable role 
in Chinese leader’s decision-making calculus. I argue that this is because 
the concept of territorial sovereignty and integrity, as well as the factors I 
used to measure it, are rooted in the neorealist school of international affairs. 
The primacy of territory, of sovereignty, and of concepts like threat 
perception and authority (power) are cornerstones of realist thought and 
China is often believed to behave consistent with a realist worldview.236 
Nuclear deterrence theory, founded upon game theory, is also deeply rooted 
in a realist outlook on logic and decision-making. Therefore, given the 
intertwined nature of these concepts with realism, the strong relationship 
between nuclear coercion and territorial sovereignty and integrity, or threat 
perception and power is not surprising.  
Lastly, prospect theory is useful for explaining and predicating 
China’s crisis behavior. Through the case study analyses in this paper, I 
was able to explain and predict China’s coercive and accommodative 
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policies in the ECS dispute, specifically, why China chose coercive policies 
in one part of the dispute but accommodative policies during another time 
by demonstrating how China interpreted its on situation, in ether a domain 
of gains or losses, relative to a reference point: TSI status. Through a 
systematic process, I determined that when China perceives itself in a 
domain of losses, especially in extremely disadvantageous positions, 
Chinese leaders are more likely to adopt coercive policies on the extreme 
side of the spectrum. The high accuracy of the model implies that it has 
utility outside of the ECS and possibly outside of China’s crisis behavior. 
As a result, I was able to document that the domain of actions and the 
framing effect have a significant impact on China’s decision-making in 
crisis situations. 
 
1.3 Discussion of Implications 
 
If China’s decision to employ implicit nuclear threats is based, in part, on the 
country’s perception of the status of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
the implications are profound. First, if similar conditions are observed, such 
as a territorial dispute where the military conflict is probable, the 3-factor TSI 
prospect theory model can be applied once again to predict what type of policy 
China is likely to adopt. Armed with knowledge of China’s behavioral patterns, 
neighboring states as well as the U.S. can learn to manage crises with China 
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more effectively, improving regional stability. Currently, there are few 
predictive models that can be used symmetrically for this purpose. 
 Next, if the only well-document cases of China’s nuclear threats are all 
confined to territorial disputes, there is likely a deeper connection between 
China’s beliefs about territorial sovereignty and integrity and the internal 
workings of the CCP that previously understood. If China is willing to threaten 
nuclear attack—a state with a self-avowed “no-first-use” (NFU) nuclear 
weapons policy—genuinely or not because of fear or insecurity about 
challenges to its borders, its internal security, and challenges to its power in 
general, there is a deep connection between CCP regime security and the 
lengths China is willing to go to ensure the Communist Party’s survival. This 
point raises further implications about China’s no-first-use policy and its 
nuclear arsenal modernization programs. Will China always adhere to the 
NFU and never use nuclear weapons first? If China prioritizes the security of 
the regime as an extension of territorial sovereignty and integrity, would 
leaders be willing to use the weapons first if it meant survival? 
 Finally, China’s growing power has led to notable territorial crises 
throughout the Asia-Pacific, but particularly in the East and South China Seas, 
bringing China into conflict with many rival claimants. Will a perceived 
vulnerability regarding China’s TSI status lead to more coercive and riskier 
policies being adopted by Beijing to win disputes? Somewhat ironically, the 
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implications of the TSI model tell a different story. As China’s power grows, 
in particular its military and economic power vis a vis other states, it’s threat 
perception of neighbors will decrease and its ability to control events (in the 
sense that it can prevent them from spiraling out of control) will increase. The 
result will be that China’s TSI status will become increasingly resistant to 
insecurity and vulnerability, reducing the likelihood that China will be placed 
in a domain of losses. Consequently, the less often China is in a domain of 
losses, the less often Beijing will feel the need to force a favorable outcome 
and recoup losses using coercive policies. Instead, as China’s power grows, 
it’s TSI status will be less threatened, placing it in a domain of gains in various 
territorial disputes, where China is more likely to adopt accommodative 
policies, the de-escalation of crises, and a more stable region. According to 
the TSI prospect theory model, therefore, China’s growing power will enhance 
regional stability and lead to less conflict, challenging traditional realist 
interpretations of China’s rise.  
 
2. Limitations and Areas of Future Research  
 
Compared to Kai He’s political-survival prospect theory model, my 3-factor 
TSI model is more context-dependent, and most likely only effective for 
analyzing territorial disputes, whereas He’s model can be applied to most any 
crisis due to its focus on Putnam’s two-level game as well as individual 
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leadership. I argue, however, that because of the frequency, importance, and 
salience of territorial disputes, the model is highly applicable to other crises as 
well as other countries. More importantly, my paper focused on using the 
model to explain one specific type of crisis behavior, whereas He’s model was 
designed to explore all types of behavior associated with foreign policy crises. 
While this limited the number of relevant case studies I could analyze, it 
increased the depth with which I was able to analyze and compare each, 
making the individual results of my cases more substantial. Finally, I argue 
that the implications of my model novel and profound. By using the model to 
specifically look at China’s nuclear signaling behavior, I have deepened 
China’s crisis behavior literature while filling a gap in the nuclear coercion 
literature. Future research programs should begin to apply new prospect theory 
models to the crisis behavior of China and other states. Considering the 
importance of nuclear weapons and the powerful incentives to prevent nuclear 
war, future research should also examine the conditions under which countries 






Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Foreign policy crisis behavior typology  
(Source: Kai He, 2016. “China’s Crisis Behavior.”) 
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*Each cell reflects the relative risk propensity of different foreign policy 
behaviors available to states during crises. Cell 1 represents the least 




Figure 2. 3-Factor TSI Prospect Theory Model – High Severity Crisis 
(Source: Kai He, 2016) 
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Figure 3. 3-Factor TSI Prospect Theory Model – Low Severity Crisis 
(Source: Kai He, 2016) 
 
Low severity crisis (+)      Aggregate = (+)  
 
*Each Cell represents China’s domain of actions in relation to its TSI status. Measured from 
Lowest, Low, High, and Highest, each Cell represents the level of threat to the country’s 
territorial sovereignty and integrity status. For example, Cell 3 demonstrates that when TSI 
status is very low (Lowest), China finds itself in a domain of losses. According to prospect 
theory, China is more likely to engage in risk-acceptant behavior, defined in this paper as 
either diplomatic or military coercion. Conversely, Cell 2 depicts a situation in which China 
is very confident in its TSI status, perceives itself in a domain of gains, and is more likely 
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Figure 4. Territorial sovereignty & integrity model of crisis behavior. 















Figure 5.1 Prospect-Threat spectrum model. Visualization of policy options 
available to states during foreign policy crises (Source: Kai He, 2016). 
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Figure 5.2 Prospect-Severity model with policy options during crisis. 
(Source: Kai He, 2016) 
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Figure 5.3 Prospect-Authority model with policy strategies for crises. 
(Source: Kai He, 2016) 
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Figure 6. Map of the East China Sea and overlapping claims  



































Figure 7: China vs. Japan GDP Comparison (Source: MGM Research, 2018).  
 











Figure 10. Prospect-Severity model with policy strategies during crisis. 

































Figure 10. Chinese incursions into Japan’s claimed territorial waters. 
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중국의 확장하고 있는 힘과 강압적인 태도는 아시아 태평양 지역 
안정에 중대한 영향을 미친다. 아시아 전역의 영토 분쟁에서 이러한 
안정을 이루기 위한 중요한 요소 중 하나는 중국의 위기 행동이다. 이 
논문은 중국 지도자들이 다른 실행 가능한 정책 대안이 아닌 핵 
억지력을 선택하는 상황의 조건을 확인하여 냉전 후 중국의 핵 제지 
위협의 성격을 이해하고자 한다. 둘째, 이 논문은 그 조건들을 확인하기 
위해 중국의 위기 행동에 대한 새로운 전망 이론의 유용성을 탐구한다. 
우선, 이 연구 결과는 영토의 주권과 보전이 핵 강제에 관여하기로 한 
결정에 큰 영향을 미친다고 제안한다. 또한, 중국의 권력이 성장함에 
따라 베이징이 불리한 위치에 놓이게 되어 핵 강제와 같은 강압적인 
정책을 채택할 필요가 없다는 것을 제시함으로써 중국 군의 방향에 
대한 현실주의 예측에 이의를 제기한다. 마지막으로, 이러한 결과는 
전망 이론이 국제 관계와 중국의 위기 관리 행동에서 중요한 설명력과 
예측력을 가지고 있음을 시사한다. 
 
키워드: 중국, 일본, 핵 억지력, 핵 강제, 센카쿠/조어도 분쟁, 동중국해, 
위기, 영토 주권 
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